

Primer on Short-Lived Climate Pollutants

Slowing the rate of global warming over the near term by cutting short-lived climate pollutants to complement carbon dioxide reductions for the long term



Institute for Governance & Sustainable Development

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The Institute for Governance & Sustainable Development's mission is to promote just and sustainable societies and to protect the environment by advancing the understanding, development, and implementation of effective, accountable and democratic systems of governance for sustainable development.

Beginning in 2005, the Institute embarked on a “fast-action” climate mitigation campaign to promote strategies that will result in significant reductions of emissions, temperature, and impacts in the near term, focusing primarily on strategies to reduce non-CO₂ climate pollutants, to complement cuts in CO₂, which is responsible for more than half of all warming. It is essential to reduce both non-CO₂ pollutants and CO₂. Neither alone is sufficient to limit the increase in global temperature to a safe level.

IGSD's fast-action strategies include reducing emissions of short-lived climate pollutants—black carbon, methane, tropospheric ozone, and hydrofluorocarbons. They also include measures to capture, reuse, and / or store CO₂ after it is emitted, including biosequestration and strategies to turn biomass into more stable forms of carbon for long-term storage.

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Executive Summary

Carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions are responsible for 55-60% of anthropogenic radiative forcing.¹ Fast and aggressive CO₂ mitigation is therefore essential to combat the resulting climate change. But this is not enough. CO₂ mitigation must be combined with fast and aggressive reductions of the pollutants causing the other 40-45% of forcing.² These pollutants include black carbon, tropospheric ozone, methane, and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). Because these pollutants have atmospheric lifetimes of only days to a decade and a half, they are referred to as short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs). Reducing SLCPs is critical for slowing the rate of climate change over the next several decades and for protecting the people and regions most vulnerable to near-term climate impacts.

Although we have known about SLCPs for more than thirty-five years,³ the following scientific developments have catapulted them to the front lines in the battle against climate change.

- *First* is the recognition that we have already added enough greenhouse gases to warm the planet by 2.4°C or more during this century.⁴ Much of this warming has been offset by cooling aerosols, primarily sulfates, which are being reduced under current air pollution policies. These reductions are important, but will contribute to near-term warming. Without fast-action mitigation to cut SLCPs, warming may cross the 1.5° to 2°C threshold by mid-century. Reducing SLCPs is the most effective strategy for constraining warming and associated impacts in the near term, since most of their

warming effect disappears within weeks to a decade and a half after reductions.

- *Second* is the recognition that in addition to being climate forcers, three of the four SLCPs are also air pollutants that damage public health and ecosystems. Reducing them will prevent millions of premature deaths every year, protect tens of millions of tonnes of crops, and contribute to sustainable development.
- *Third* is the recognition that the benefits for health, crops, and sustainable development will accrue primarily in the nations or regions that take action to mitigate these pollutants, due to the stronger impacts black carbon and tropospheric ozone have near their emissions sources.
- *Fourth* is the recognition that there are practical and proven ways to reduce all four of these pollutants and that existing laws and institutions are often available to support immediate reductions.

Reducing SLCPs has the potential to avoid 0.6°C global average warming by 2050⁵ and more than 0.84°C in the Arctic by 2070.⁶ This would cut the current rate of global warming by half, the rate of warming in the Arctic by two thirds, and the rate of warming over the elevated regions of the Himalayas and Tibet by at least half.⁷ By the end of the century cutting SLCPs can prevent as much as 1.1°C of warming, the same amount as an aggressive mitigation effort for carbon dioxide.⁸

Reducing SLCPs will in turn:

- Help stabilize regional climate systems and reduce heat waves, fires, droughts, floods and hurricanes in mid-latitudes, and slow shifts in monsoons, expansion of desertification, and increases in cyclones in the tropics.
- Slow the melting of glaciers and Arctic sea ice.⁹

- Cut the rate of sea-level rise by a quarter and cumulative sea-level rise by more than 20%.¹⁰
- Slow the pace of other climate impacts and provide critical time to adapt to unavoidable impacts.

The primary direct local benefits for developing countries from reducing SLCPs include:

- Saving millions of lives a year and significantly reducing other illnesses.
- Improving food security.
- Expanding access to sustainable energy for the billions forced to depend on traditional cooking and heating fuels.
- Protecting infrastructure and giving low-lying coastal and island states at risk from sea-level rise more time to adapt.

Reductions in all of these SLCPs can be achieved quickly, and in most cases by using existing technologies and existing laws and institutions.

Using existing technologies and institutions to reduce these non-CO₂ climate pollutants may offer the best near-term protection for the countries that are most vulnerable to climate change impacts, including island nations, countries with low-lying coastal areas, and agriculture-dependent countries in Asia and Africa already suffering droughts, floods, and shifting rainfall. Slowing the rate of climate change and reducing near-term impacts is a critical complement to adaptation strategies and to sustainable development, with the potential to provide global benefits for climate, crops, and health valued at \$5.9 trillion annually, starting in 2030.

All four of these SLCPs are being addressed in the Climate & Clean Air Coalition to Reduce Short-Lived Climate Pollutants (CCAC). The CCAC is comprised of developing and developed countries, along with UNEP, UNDP, UNIDO, the European Commission,

and the World Bank, as well as non-governmental organizations.¹¹ The G8 countries joined the Coalition and their leaders requested the World Bank to conduct a study of how best to integrate SLCP reductions in its programs.¹² In April, the G8 Foreign Ministers affirmed that the “G8 remain fully committed to the UNFCCC process;... [and] to increase mitigation ambition in the pre-2020 timeframe, including through international cooperative initiatives such as the Climate and Clean Air Coalition....”¹³

In addition to being included in the CCAC, HFCs are addressed in the Rio + 20 declaration, *The Future We Want*, where the world’s leaders supported phasing down HFC production and use.¹⁴ Such a phase down can be achieved through the Montreal Protocol, while simultaneously improving the energy efficiency of refrigerators, air conditioners, and other equipment and products that use these chemicals, thus reducing CO₂ emissions as well. The Federated States of Micronesia and the Kingdom of Morocco have made a formal proposal to amend the Montreal Protocol to do this,¹⁵ as have the North American Parties (Mexico, Canada, and the U.S.).¹⁶ As of 2013 more than 100 Parties have expressed support.¹⁷ Action at national and regional levels, such as the European Union’s regulatory efforts¹⁸, also can reduce HFCs, as can voluntary efforts.¹⁹

Although reducing SLCPs is essential for reducing near-term warming and climate impacts, it is not sufficient. Aggressive reductions in CO₂ emissions also are essential for limiting temperature rise. However, in contrast to the short lifetime of SLCPs, only about half of CO₂ emissions are removed from the atmosphere in the first hundred years with a significant fraction lasting for several millennia.²⁰ Reducing CO₂ emissions now, in line with 450 parts per million (ppm) or stricter scenarios, can avoid approximately 0.1°C of additional warming by 2050 compared to the warming expected from a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario,

and 1.1°C by 2100.²¹ Cuts to CO₂ alone would still see temperatures rise above 2°C by the middle of the century (*see* Fig. 4 & 6). However, if large-scale reductions of both CO₂ and SLCPs are undertaken now there is a high probability of keeping the increase in global temperature to less than 1.5°C above the pre-industrial temperature for the next 30 years and to less than 2°C above for the rest of the century (*see* Fig. 4).²²

Introduction to Short-Lived Climate Pollutants

CO₂ emissions account for 55-60% of current anthropogenic radiative forcing. Fast and aggressive CO₂ cuts are essential to combat the resulting climate change. But this is not enough. CO₂ cuts must be combined with fast and aggressive cuts to SLCPs, which are causing the other 40-45% of forcing.

Black Carbon

Black carbon is a potent climate-forcing aerosol that remains in the atmosphere for only a few days or weeks.²³ It is a component of soot and is a product of the incomplete combustion of fossil fuels, biofuels, and biomass.²⁴ Black carbon contributes to climate change in several ways: it warms the atmosphere directly by absorbing solar radiation and emitting it as heat, it contributes to melting by darkening the surfaces of ice and snow when it is deposited on them, and it can also affect the microphysical properties of clouds in a manner that can perturb precipitation patterns. Recent estimates of black carbon's radiative forcing confirm that it is the second leading cause of global warming.²⁵ The total climate forcing of black carbon is 1.1 W m⁻², second only to CO₂ (1.7 W m⁻²).²⁶

Black carbon also harms human health; it is a primary component of fine particle air pollution (PM_{2.5}), and can cause or contribute to a number of adverse health effects, including asthma and other respiratory problems, low birth weights, heart attacks, and lung cancer.²⁷

The main sources of black carbon are open burning of biomass, diesel engines, and the residential burning of solid fuels such as coal, wood, dung, and agricultural residues.²⁸ In 2000, global emissions of black carbon were estimated at approximately 7.5 million tons, with a large uncertainty range.²⁹

Black carbon is co-emitted with other pollutants, some of which are light in color and cause cooling by scattering solar radiation back into the atmosphere.³⁰ The type and quantity of co-pollutants differs by source, and a high ratio of warming to cooling pollutants indicates the most promising sources to target for producing fast cooling.³¹ A recent assessment of black carbon confirmed that emissions from diesel engines and some industrial and residential coal sources have the highest ratio of black carbon to lighter co-emitted pollutants compared to other black carbon sources.³²

Recent research shows that a type of organic carbon co-pollutant known as “brown carbon” strongly absorbs solar radiation at specific wavelengths, also making it a potent climate forcer.³³ Climate models have largely ignored the forcing from brown carbon, with some implicitly including some or all in the total forcing of black carbon, but most excluding it completely, which has led them to the conclusion that the combination of organic carbon co-pollutants with black carbon causes net global cooling.³⁴ Brown carbon’s warming effect appears to be offsetting some or all of the lighter organic carbon particles’ cooling effect. This, in turn indicates that reducing emissions from black carbon sources that have a high proportion of organic carbon co-emitted pollutants, such as the open burning of biomass, may still reduce warming.³⁵

Over areas of snow and ice, such as the Arctic, even sources with a large proportion of pollutants that normally cause cooling

still produce significant warming.³⁶ This is because deposition of both darker and lighter particles, including dust, reduces the reflectivity (albedo) of snow and ice, allowing more solar radiation to be absorbed, which causes local warming and increases surface melting.³⁷ Regardless of the climate effect, all particle pollutants harm human health.³⁸

Thanks to modern pollution controls and fuel switching, black carbon emissions in North America and Europe were significantly curbed in the early 1900s. However, mobile sources, particularly diesel vehicles, continue to be a major source category for these regions.³⁹ Black carbon sources in developing countries are significantly different from those in North America and Europe. In developing countries, a much larger proportion of black carbon emissions comes from residential heating and cooking, and industry.⁴⁰ According to UNEP, global emissions of black carbon are expected to remain relatively stable through 2030, with continuing reductions in North America and Europe largely offset by continued growth in other parts of the world.⁴¹

Methane

Methane is a powerful greenhouse gas with a 100-year global warming potential 21 times that of CO₂ and an atmospheric lifetime of approximately 12 years.⁴² About 60% of global methane emissions are due to human activities.⁴³ The main sources of anthropogenic methane emissions are oil and gas systems; agriculture, including enteric fermentation, manure management, and rice cultivations; landfills; wastewater treatment; and emissions from coal mines. Methane is the primary component of natural gas, with some emitted to the atmosphere during its production, processing, storage, transmission, and distribution.⁴⁴

The radiative forcing of methane in 2005 was 0.48 W/m^2 , which is about 30% of CO_2 radiative forcing.⁴⁵ According to a recent UNEP and WMO assessment, anthropogenic methane emissions are expected to grow 25% over 2005 levels by 2030, driven by increased production from coal mining and oil and gas production, and growth in agricultural and municipal waste emissions.⁴⁶

Tropospheric Ozone

Ozone is a reactive gas which, when in the stratosphere, absorbs dangerous ultraviolet radiation; however, lower atmosphere (tropospheric) ozone is a major air and climate pollutant which causes warming and is harmful to human health and crop production.⁴⁷ Breathing ozone is particularly dangerous to children, older adults and people with lung diseases, and can cause bronchitis, emphysema, asthma, and may permanently scar lung tissue.⁴⁸ Its impacts on plant include not only lower crop yields but also a reduced ability to absorb CO_2 .⁴⁹


Tropospheric ozone is not emitted directly but instead forms from reactions between precursor gases, both human-produced and natural. These precursor gases include carbon monoxide, oxides of nitrogen (NOx), and volatile organic compounds (VOCs), which include methane. Globally increased methane emissions are responsible for approximately two thirds of the rise in tropospheric ozone.⁵⁰ Reducing emissions of methane will lead to significant reductions in tropospheric ozone and its damaging effects.⁵¹

Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs)

HFCs are factory-made chemicals used primarily in refrigeration and insulating foams. They have a warming effect hundreds to

thousands of times more powerful than CO₂. The average lifetime of the mix of HFCs, weighted by usage, is 15 years.⁵² HFCs are the fastest growing greenhouse gases in many countries, including the U.S., where CO₂-eq emissions grew 6% between 2010 and 2011 compared to CO₂, which shrank by almost 2% over the same period.⁵³ Globally, HFC emissions are growing 10 to 15% per year and are expected to double by 2020. Without fast action to limit their growth, by 2050 the annual climate forcing of HFCs could equal nearly 20% of the forcing from CO₂ emissions in a BAU scenario, and up to 40% of the forcing from CO₂ emissions under a scenario where CO₂ concentrations have been limited to 450 parts ppm (*see* Fig. 1).⁵⁴ This is about the same as the forcing from present annual CO₂ emissions from the transportation sector.

Figure 1: HFCs Projected to be up to 20-40% of RF of CO₂ in 2050



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Projected radiative forcing of climate by HFCs and CO₂ since 2000, when the influence of HFCs was essentially zero. The HFC climate forcing for an upper range scenario is compared with the CO₂ forcing for the range of scenarios from IPCC-SRES and the 450 ppm CO₂ stabilization scenario. Clearly, the contribution of HFCs to radiative forcing could be very significant in the future; by 2050, it could be as much as a quarter of that due to CO₂ increases since 2000, if the upper range HFC scenario is compared to the median of the SRES scenario. Alternatively, the contribution of HFCs to radiative forcing could be one fifth the radiative forcing due to CO₂ increases since 2000, if the upper range HFC scenario is compared to the upper range of the SRES scenario. The contribution of HFCs to radiative forcing could also be as much as 40% of the radiative forcing by CO₂ under the 450 ppm scenario.⁵⁵


Both CO₂ Mitigation and SLCP Mitigation Are Critical for Climate Safety

Importance of Immediate CO₂ Mitigation

CO₂ is the single most significant climate forcer, accounting for 55-60% of present climate forcing. Substantial and immediate reductions in CO₂ emissions are necessary to slow further global temperature rise, although CO₂ reductions are less effective than SLCPs for limiting warming in the near-term. For example, if CO₂ concentrations were held to a peak of 440 ppm by mid-century and reduced to 420 ppm by 2100, this would avoid only 0.1°C in warming by 2050,⁵⁶ and global temperatures would still rise above 2°C by the middle of the century (*see* Fig. 4 & 6). By the end of the century, however, the warming avoided by cutting CO₂ will equal that of SLCPs (~1.1°C).⁵⁷

CO₂ emissions continue to cause warming over the long term because of their long lifetime in the atmosphere. While approximately 50% of CO₂ is removed from the atmosphere within a century, a substantial portion (20-40%) of CO₂ emissions remains in the atmosphere for millennia (*see* Fig. 2).⁵⁸ In addition much of the heat trapped by CO₂ emissions is stored in the deep oceans and once emissions are reduced is returned on a multiple-century timescale.⁵⁹

Figure 2: Time Scales for Removal of CO₂ from the Atmosphere




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Model simulation of atmospheric CO₂ concentration for >100,000 years following a large CO₂ release from combustion of fossil fuels. Different fractions of the released gas recover on different timescales.⁶⁰

The warming and resulting impacts caused by CO₂ that has already been released is effectively irreversible on human timescales (Fig. 3 black line), absent geo-engineering.⁶¹ The longer the world waits to make significant cuts in CO₂ emissions, the more severe the permanent impacts will be, including impacts from changes in the frequency and severity of extreme weather events and from sea-level rise.⁶² Committed sea-level rise from thermal expansion alone could be as high as one meter (~3 feet) if atmospheric CO₂ concentrations are allowed to exceed 600 ppm (*see* Fig. 3 red band).⁶³ (Atmospheric CO₂ concentrations reached 397.34 ppm in March 2013⁶⁴ and could reach as high as 1,100 ppm by the end of this century under some BAU scenarios.⁶⁵).

Figure 3: Irreversible Sea-Level Rise and Warming from CO₂



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The black line shows irreversible global average surface warming based upon peak atmospheric CO₂ concentrations. The red band shows lower limit range of corresponding sea-level rise from thermal expansion only, due to peak atmospheric CO₂ concentrations. The black line depicts committed warming due to increasing peak CO₂ emissions, which will be irreversible on human timescales.⁶⁶

Moreover, significantly reducing CO₂ emissions requires decarbonizing global energy systems⁶⁷ through a portfolio of actions including conservation and efficiency improvements to reduce the carbon intensity of energy use, along with the replacement of fossil fuels with renewables, carbon capture, reuse, and storage, and numerous other steps.⁶⁸ Building the new low-carbon energy system will, however, require the continuing use of the current energy system with associated CO₂ emissions.⁶⁹ This, plus the ocean-thermal inertia, means that even aggressive efforts to build the clean energy systems will not alone be able to reduce climate impacts significantly through 2050.⁷⁰

Importance of Immediate SLCP Mitigation


Cutting SLCPs is a critical climate strategy for reducing near-term global warming and its impacts, particularly in regions most vulnerable to climate change, as well as for offsetting the near-term warming that will result from reductions of cooling aerosols such as sulfates, which are important to reduce to protect public health and ecosystems despite the warming this will cause.

SLCPs account for approximately 40-45% of present climate forcing.⁷¹ In contrast to CO₂, the short atmospheric lifetimes of SLCPs means that reducing them will produce as much as 90% of predicted prevented warming within a decade, with the final 10% delayed for hundreds of years due to ocean thermal inertia. Reducing all four SLCPs has the potential to avoid 0.6°C global warming by 2050⁷² and more than 0.84°C in the Arctic by 2070,⁷³ which can cut the rate of global warming by half, the rate of Arctic warming by two thirds, and can reduce warming in the high altitude Himalayan-Tibetan Plateau by at least half.⁷⁴ (During the past half century, the rate of global warming has been about 0.13°C per decade.⁷⁵ The rate of warming in the Arctic is currently

at least twice the global average, and the rate in the Himalayas and Tibet is about three times the global average.⁷⁶⁾ By the end of the century SLCP mitigation could avoid 1.1°C of warming, almost a third of the expected BAU warming between 2005 and 2100 (Fig 4. black line).⁷⁷

While the measured warming from climate pollutants is presently about 0.8°C above preindustrial levels, the total warming that is committed but yet not fully realized from historic emissions through 2005 is estimated to be 2.4 to 4.3°C.⁷⁸ Up to 1.15°C of this committed warming is currently being ‘masked’ by emissions of cooling aerosols, primarily sulfates, from fossil fuel and biomass combustion which are now being rapidly reduced to protect human health and ecosystems.⁷⁹ Unmasking this committed warming could push global temperatures over the 2°C guardrail by mid-century.⁸⁰ Constraining temperature rise from HFCs, black carbon, tropospheric ozone, and methane could offset the possible rapid temperature increase from reducing sulfates.

Figure 4: Warming Avoided Through Combined SLCP and CO₂ Mitigation




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Observed temperatures through 2011 and projected temperatures thereafter under various scenarios to 2100, all relative to the 1900–1910 mean. The red line depicts BAU emissions, with temperatures reaching 4.2°C by 2100; the blue line depicts strong mitigation of CO₂ (peaking in at 440 ppm by the mid-21st century and reducing to 420 ppm by 2100); the black line depicts mitigation of SLCPs only; the green line depicts combined mitigation of SLCPs and CO₂. The pink line depicts observed global mean temperatures, relative to the 1900–1910 mean, up to 2011.⁸¹

If reductions in SLCPs are delayed until 2030, it will be difficult if not impossible to keep warming under 2°C by the end of the century (Fig. 5 dashed green line).⁸²

Figure 5: Temperature Consequences of Delayed SLCP Mitigation



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
The figure depicts predicted temperature rise for three scenarios: BAU (red); full CO₂ and SLCP mitigation (solid green); and full CO₂ and SLCP mitigation with either methane mitigation beginning in 2030 or black carbon mitigation beginning in 2040 (dashed green). The pink line depicts observed temperature change and sea-level rise from 1900 to 2011.⁸³

Benefits of Combined CO₂ and SLCP Mitigation

CO₂ and SLCPs can be thought of as two separate control knobs for temperature increase that operate independently and on different timescales.⁸⁴ Both must be turned down simultaneously and immediately as part of a comprehensive climate strategy to reduce near-term impacts, as well as the risk of abrupt climate change⁸⁵ and long-term climate destabilization. The combination of CO₂ mitigation and SLCP mitigation can avoid as much as 0.7°C of

additional warming by mid-century, increasing to 2.3°C by 2100.⁸⁶ This combined mitigation provides the greatest chance of keeping global temperatures below 1.5°C for the next 30 to 40 years and global temperatures below the 2°C guardrail through 2100.⁸⁷

Figure 6: Temperature Rise Predictions Under Various Mitigation Scenarios



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
Observed temperatures through 2009 and projected temperatures thereafter under various scenarios to 2070, all relative to the 1890–1910 mean. Results for future scenarios are the central values from analytic equations estimating the response to forcings calculated from composition-climate modeling and literature assessments. The rightmost bars give 2070 ranges, including uncertainty in radiative forcing and climate sensitivity. A portion of the uncertainty is systematic, so that overlapping ranges do not mean there is no significant difference.)⁸⁸ (Note: HFC mitigation is not included in this graph, although it is included in Fig. 4, above.)

Benefits for Climate Vulnerable Regions

Global warming is expressed as a global average increase in surface temperature, but warming is experienced unevenly across different regions, with some of the world's most vulnerable regions warming much faster than the global average rate.⁸⁹ For example, Africa is warming about one and a half times faster than the average, and the Arctic and the Himalayan-Tibetan plateau are warming two to three times of the average global rate.⁹⁰ Therefore, it is particularly important that SLCP reductions may be able to rapidly reduce the rate of regional warming in places such as the Arctic, the high elevation regions of the Himalayas and Tibet,⁹¹ and other regions with vulnerable climates, including those where enhanced warming may trigger amplifying feedbacks and/or the passage of potential climate tipping points—the points at which a chain of events escalate such that it is impossible to return to former condition.

Warming in the Arctic and Himalayan-Tibetan plateau in particular could lead to dangerous climate feedbacks that cause warming to accelerate past tipping points. One example of such a feedback is the melting of Arctic snow and sea-ice, which reached a record low in September 2012.⁹² As the reflective ice and snow is replaced with darker heat-absorbing land and ocean, warming can amplify,⁹³ which in turn further reduces ice and snow cover, creating the dangerous feedback loop.⁹⁴ Over the past thirty years the minimum extent of Arctic summer sea-ice has decreased by 13% per decade, reaching a new record minimum in 2012, nearly 50% less than the 1979 to 2000 average (Fig. 7).⁹⁵ Scientists now predict that BAU emissions could lead to an Arctic free of summer sea-ice within a few decades.⁹⁶

Figure 7: Record Minimum Arctic Summer Sea-Ice Extent



Source: NASA/Goddard Scientific Visualization Studio

Image of minimum Arctic sea-ice on September 16, 2012, the record minimum recorded Arctic sea-ice according to the National Snow & Ice Data Center. The sea-ice extent dropped to 3.41 million square kilometers (1.32 million square miles), 18% lower than the previous record minimum of 4.17 million square kilometers (1.61 million square miles) set September 18, 2007, and the first time Arctic sea-ice has shrunk below 4 million kilometers. The yellow line signifies the average minimum Arctic summer sea-ice extent between 1979 and 2010.⁹⁷ According to NASA the 2013 Arctic winter sea-ice maximum on 15 February was the fifth lowest in the past 35 years; nine of the ten lowest winter sea-ice maximums have occurred in the past ten years.⁹⁸

Arctic warming also thaws permafrost—perennial frozen ground—that underlies as much as 25% of the land area in the Northern Hemisphere and extends under parts of the Arctic Ocean.⁹⁹ Terrestrial permafrost contains nearly twice as much carbon trapped in frozen biomass as the entire atmospheric carbon pool; a release of only 1% of the reservoir of methane trapped in under-water permafrost could risk triggering abrupt climate change.¹⁰⁰

Black carbon is estimated to be responsible for 50% of the increase in Arctic warming, or almost 1°C of the total 1.9°C increase between 1890 and 2007.¹⁰¹ Approximately 50% of the warming on the Himalayan-Tibetan plateau has also been attributed to black carbon.¹⁰² Cutting black carbon, tropospheric ozone and methane can cut the rate of warming in the Arctic by two thirds and the rate of warming over the elevated regions of the Himalayan-Tibetan plateau by at least half.¹⁰³ Reducing these pollutants is essential, though not sufficient for saving the Arctic and other vulnerable places in the short term.¹⁰⁴

Benefits for Human Health and Food Security

In addition to climate benefits, reducing SLCs provides strong benefits for public health and food security. Both black carbon and tropospheric ozone are major air pollutants contributing to more than six million deaths annually, including 3.5 million deaths from household air pollution from solid fuels, 3.1 million deaths from ambient particulate matter pollution, and 0.2 million deaths from ambient ozone pollution.¹⁰⁵ Globally, air pollution is the fourth leading preventable risk factor for death, behind poor diet, and high blood pressure, and about the same as tobacco smoke.¹⁰⁶ In South Asia, which includes India, indoor air pollution alone is the leading preventable risk factor for the burden of disease, which is defined as early mortality and years lived at less than full health,¹⁰⁷ while in Eastern, Central, and Western Sub-Saharan Africa it is ranked second, and third in South East Asia.¹⁰⁸ This is a significant drag on sustainable development. For example, air pollution is estimated to cost China 1.2% of its gross domestic product every year.¹⁰⁹

Global deployment of a suite of fourteen black carbon and methane mitigation measures (discussed below) can prevent up to 4.7

million air pollution related deaths each year, and increase global crop yields by up to 135 million metric tons while repairing the ability of plants to sequester carbon, a function now being impaired by tropospheric ozone.¹¹⁰ According to one study, the deaths avoided from technically possible reductions in black carbon and methane would represent “1-8% of cardiopulmonary and lung cancer deaths among those age 30 years and older, and 1-7% of all deaths for all ages.”¹¹¹ Improvements in crop production are estimated to be up to 4% of total annual global production of the four major staple grains: maize, rice, soybeans, and wheat.¹¹²

Due to the heightened effects of black carbon and tropospheric ozone near emissions sources, these benefits, including much of the climate mitigation benefits, are enjoyed largely by the regions making the cuts. For example, eliminating emissions of black carbon from traditional solid biomass stoves with improved cook stoves would have a major impact in reducing black carbon direct climate effects over South Asia (by about 60%).¹¹³

Benefits for Reducing Sea-Level Rise

The potential impact of rising oceans is one of the most visible and costly effects of climate change. Rising sea-levels will impact key sectors in coastal and island states, including water resources, agriculture, fisheries and infrastructure, and will increase vulnerability to flooding and storm surges, which are expected to become more frequent and stronger as temperatures increase.¹¹⁴ Sea levels are projected to rise between 0.56 and 2 meters (~2 to 6 feet) in this century.¹¹⁵ Global changes in sea-level do not occur uniformly, with some regions experiencing much greater levels of sea-level rise than others, with the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific expected to see 10-20% higher sea-level rise than the global average.¹¹⁶

According to a new modeling study, cutting SLCPs now can reduce the rate of sea-level rise by 18% by 2050 and 24% by the end of the century.¹¹⁷ In contrast, cutting CO₂ will do little to reduce sea-level rise in the first half of the century but will equal the rate reduction of SLCPs by 2100, bringing the total reduction in the rate of sea-level rise to 50%.¹¹⁸ Combined SLCP and CO₂ mitigation will reduce cumulative sea-level rise by 31% by 2100, with SLCPs providing 71% of the total (41% from methane measures; 13% from HFC measures; and 17% from black carbon (Fig. 8)).¹¹⁹ The remaining 29% is from CO₂ measures.


A recent OECD report ranked the top twenty at-risk cities (out of 130 key port cities worldwide) with assets and population that will be at the greatest risk from storm and flood damage due to climate change and sea-level rise of only one meter (~3 feet), and estimated that \$35 trillion in assets and 150 million people will be at risk in the top 20 cities in 2070.¹²⁰ Eight of the top ten cities with assets exposed and nine of the top ten with populations at risk are in Asian countries (Table 1).

Table 1: Top 10 Cities Exposed to Coastal Flooding Damages in 2070¹²¹

Assets Exposed in 2070			Population Exposed in 2070		
	City	Assets (\$Billion)		City	Population
1	Miami (USA)	3,513.04	1	Calcutta (India)	14,014,000
2	Guangzhou (China)	3,357.72	2	Mumbai (India)	11,418,000
3	New York-Newark (USA)	2,147.35	3	Dhaka (Bangladesh)	11,135,000
4	Calcutta (India)	1,961.44	4	Guangzhou (China)	10,333,000
5	Shanghai (China)	1,771.17	5	Ho Chi Minh City (Vietnam)	9,216,000
6	Mumbai (India)	1,598.05	6	Shanghai (China)	5,451,000
7	Tianjin (China)	1,231.48	7	Bangkok (Thailand)	5,138,000
8	Tokyo (Japan)	1,207.07	8	Rangoon (Myanmar)	4,965,000
9	Hong Kong (China)	1,163.89	9	Miami (USA)	4,795,000
10	Bangkok (Thailand)	1,117.54	10	Hai Phong (Vietnam)	4,711,000

Reducing the extent of sea-level rise in this century will limit some of the worst predicted impacts of climate change and slowing the rate of rise will give vulnerable countries and populations critical extra time to adapt. Delaying mitigation of SLCPs by 25 years (to 2040) will decrease the impact of both CO₂ and SLCP mitigation on sea-level rise this century by ~30% and could increase sea-level rise by up to 11%.¹²²

Figure 8: Predicted Reductions in 21st Century Sea-Level Rise Due to SLCP and CO₂ Mitigation



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Projected sea-level rise in the 21st century from BAU emissions and mitigation scenarios. The solid green line depicts full mitigation of CO₂ (peaking at 440 ppm and reducing to 420 ppm by 2100) and SLCPs (50% reductions in CO emissions and 30% in methane emissions by 2030, and 50% in black carbon emissions by 2050) beginning immediately. The solid blue line depicts reductions in cumulative sea-level rise from CO₂ mitigation alone, and the dashed blue and dashed green lines depict reductions from the inclusion of methane, and methane with HFCs respectively. Uncertainties in the reduction of sea-level rise are shown for the CO₂ + CH₄, and CO₂ + CH₄ + HFC + BC scenarios.¹²³

Mitigation Measures for Short-Lived Climate Pollutants

Black Carbon and Methane Mitigation

Recent studies have identified fourteen mitigation measures targeting emissions of black carbon and methane that can provide immediate benefits.¹²⁴ These measures are capable of reducing global methane emissions by ~38% and emissions of black carbon by ~77%, realizing “nearly 90% of the maximum reduction in net GWP,” from these sources.¹²⁵

Methane Control Measures

- Control fugitive emissions from oil and gas production
- Control emissions from coal mining
- Control fugitive emissions from long distance gas transmission
- Capture gas from municipal waste and landfills
- Capture gas from wastewater treatment facilities
- Capture gas from livestock manure
- Intermittent aeration of constantly flooded rice paddies

Black Carbon Control Measures

- Install particulate filters on diesel vehicles
- Replace traditional cooking stoves with clean burning biomass stoves
- Modernize brick kilns
- Modernize coke ovens
- Ban open burning of biomass
- Eliminate high emitting on and off-road diesel vehicles
- Provide global access to modern cooking and heating

Reducing diesel black carbon emissions along with other key sources, including brick kilns and residential solid fuel burning, can quickly reduce warming because of the low levels of co-emitted cooling aerosols from these sources.¹²⁶ In addition, replacing the millions of kerosene-fueled simple wick lamps used in many developing countries, with low cost and low-emission lamps, could provide significant black carbon mitigation.¹²⁷ A recent study commissioned by the International Maritime Organization identified a number of abatement options for black carbon emissions from international commercial shipping, which represents 1-2% of global emissions, and concluded that emissions can be dramatically reduced at a cost savings by converting to liquefied natural gas to fuel ships, and combining slower ship speeds with electronically controlled engines.¹²⁸

Most of the control measures for reducing black carbon, and for reducing tropospheric ozone by reducing one of its precursors, methane, can be implemented today with existing technologies, and often with existing laws and institutions, including through enhancement and enforcement of existing air quality regulations.¹²⁹

Half of the identified black carbon and methane measures can be implemented with a net cost savings averaged globally.¹³⁰ Recent analysis indicates that approximately 64% of predicted reductions in methane from the identified measures can be achieved for less than \$250 per metric ton, well below the estimated ~\$1000 per metric ton value gained from climate mitigation, improved health outcomes, and crop production.¹³¹ For black carbon, improved efficiencies from modernizing brick kilns and replacing traditional wood burning stoves can lead to a net cost savings, and together account for approximately half of possible black carbon reductions.¹³² Recent research indicates that a large portion of the remaining black carbon mitigation measures will likely cost substantially less than the value of the health, climate, and

crop benefits achieved (*see* Table 1).¹³³ All of these mitigation measures are ultimately cost effective when the \$5.9 trillion annual benefits that start in 2030 are taken into account, and can be achieved by linearly phasing in the identified fourteen targeted control measures from 2010 through 2030 (*see* Table 1).¹³⁴

Table 2: Valuation of Global Benefits from Full Implementation of 14 SLCP Measures ¹³⁵


	Methane Measures	Black Carbon Measures	Total
Climate Benefit ¹³⁶	\$331 (449 – 213)	\$225 (343 – 13)	\$556 (792 – 226)
Crop Benefit ¹³⁷	\$4.2 (5.4 – 3)	\$4 (7.2 – 0.8)	\$8.2 (12.6 – 3.8)
Health Benefit ¹³⁸	\$148 (247 – 49)	\$5142 (9853 – 1564)	\$5290 (10100 – 1613)
Total	\$483.2 (701.4 – 265)	\$5371 (10203.2 – 1577.8)	\$5854.2 (10904.6 – 1845.2)

HFC Mitigation

The mitigation approach for reducing HFCs is different from that for black carbon and methane. Because they are manmade, HFCs can be most effectively controlled through a phase down of their production and consumption, which could take place under the Montreal Protocol.¹³⁹ The successful phase-out of CFCs and the ongoing phase-out of HCFCs have made the Montreal Protocol the world's most effective climate treaty.¹⁴⁰ Between 1990 and 2010 the Montreal Protocol reduced CO₂-eq emissions nearly twenty times more than the initial commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (*see* Fig. 9).¹⁴¹

There have been two proposals put forth to phase down high-GWP HFCs under the Montreal Protocol, one by the Federated States of Micronesia joined by the Kingdom of Morocco and the other by the North American countries, the U.S., Canada, and Mexico.¹⁴² The proposals are similar, and each would reduce 85-90% of HFC production and use, providing climate mitigation equivalent to 100 billion tonnes of CO₂ emissions by 2050 (range of 87-146 billion tonnes) (*see* Fig. 10), at very low cost. The HFC amendments would substantially eliminate the global warming caused by one of the six Kyoto Protocol greenhouse gases by avoiding the production and use of high-GWP HFCs, providing up to 7% of the total CO₂-eq mitigation needed to have a 75% chance of staying below the 2°C guardrail.¹⁴³

Figure 9: Climate Protection of the Montreal Protocol and the Kyoto Protocol



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UNEP (2012) CLIMATE PROTECTION OF THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL.¹⁴⁴


HFCs are now the fastest growing GHG pollutant in the U.S. and in many other countries. This is due in part to their being used as replacements for HCFCs, which are now being phased out, and in part to the growing global demand for air conditioning and refrigeration.¹⁴⁵ This demand is increasing as the world warms and as the population grows and gets richer. If left unchecked, by 2050 warming from annual emissions of HFCs could be equivalent to 20% of warming from annual CO₂ emissions under a BAU scenario, and up to 45% of the warming from annual CO₂ emissions under a 450 ppm CO₂ stabilization scenario.¹⁴⁶

Many national governments have taken action to reduce HFCs. Such action includes: creating national databases of equipment containing HFCs in Hungary, Slovenia, and Estonia; mandatory refrigerant leakage checks for mobile equipment in Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands; and producer responsibility schemes requiring producers and suppliers of HFCs to take back recovered bulk HFCs for further recycling, reclamation and destruction in Sweden and Germany.¹⁴⁷ The U.S. allows manufacturers of cars and light-trucks to generate credits towards their compliance with CO₂ emission standards and fuel economy CAFE standards by employing HFC alternative refrigerants in mobile air conditioning systems for model year 2012-2016 vehicles.¹⁴⁸ According to the new rules for model years 2017-2025, U.S. CAFE standards continue to provide HFC alternative credits and include credits for improvements in mobile air conditioner efficiency.¹⁴⁹ Manufacturers can earn similar credits toward compliance with California's Low Emission Vehicles (LEV III) GHG emissions standards for passenger cars, light-duty trucks, and medium-duty vehicles.¹⁵⁰ The U.S. has also adopted standards to control HFC leakage from air conditioning systems in pickups, vans, and combination tractors.¹⁵¹ The EC is currently strengthening its f-gas regulations.¹⁵²

Private companies are also taking voluntary action to limit HFCs. The Consumer Good Forum, a global network of over 650 retailers, manufactures, service providers, and other stakeholders from over seventy countries has pledged to begin phasing out HFCs in new equipment beginning in 2015.¹⁵³

Because the global weighted average lifetime of HFCs now in use is 15 years, HFCs are included in the CCAC.¹⁵⁴ In the Rio +20 declaration, *The Future We Want*, more than one hundred heads of State recognized the climate damage from HFCs and called for the gradual phase down of their production and consumption.¹⁵⁵ In addition, 108 countries have joined the *Bangkok Declaration* calling for the use of low-GWP alternatives to CFCs and HCFCs.¹⁵⁶ Through November 2012, 105 countries have joined the *Bali Declaration on Transitioning to Low Global Warming Potential Alternatives to Ozone Depleting Substances*.¹⁵⁷

Figure 10: Projected HFC Emission Reductions from FSM and NA Proposals



The North American proposal and the Micronesian proposal are similar; both decrease the cumulative (2013-2050) direct GWP-weighted emissions of HFCs to 22-24 GtCO₂-eq from 110-170 GtCO₂-eq, for a total of ~87 to 146 GtCO₂-eq in mitigation. This is equivalent to a reduction from projected annual emissions of 5.5 to 8.8 GtCO₂-eq/yr in 2050 to less than ~0.3 GtCO₂-eq/yr.¹⁵⁸

Climate & Clean Air Coalition to Reduce SLCPs

Recognizing that mitigating SLCPs is critical to addressing climate change in the near term and complementary to global efforts to reduce CO₂, in February 2012 six countries and UNEP formed the Climate & Clean Air Coalition to Reduce Short-Lived Climate Pollutants (CCAC). The objective of the CCAC is to

accelerate and scale up action to reduce SLCPs by catalyzing new actions as well as highlighting and bolstering existing efforts. It is the first global effort to treat these pollutants as a collective challenge. The CCAC is growing rapidly, and a year after its launch it has 60 Partners (listed below), a High Level Scientific Advisory Panel, a Secretariat based at UNEP's Paris office, and a series of initiatives underway to reduce SLCPs on the ground. IGSD was elected to be the initial NGO representative on the CCAC's Steering Committee.

The CCAC is reducing SLCPs by supporting and coordinating existing programs such as the Clean Cookstove Initiative and the Global Methane Initiative, while “driving development of national action plans and the adoption of policy priorities; building capacity among developing countries; mobilizing public and private action; raising awareness globally; fostering regional and international cooperation, and; improving scientific understanding of the pollutant impacts and mitigation.”¹⁵⁹

Nine targeted initiatives have been approved by the CCAC for rapid implementation.¹⁶⁰

- Reducing black carbon emissions from heavy duty diesel vehicles and engines;
- Mitigating SLCPs and other pollutants from brick production;
- Mitigating SLCPs from landfills and municipal solid waste;
- Promoting HFC alternative technologies and standards;
- Accelerating methane and black carbon reductions from oil and natural gas production;
- Financing mitigation of SLCPs;
- Promoting SLCP national action planning.
- Reducing SLCPs from household cooking and domestic heating; and,
- Regional assessments of SLCPs

The Coalition is developing an additional initiative to focus on agriculture. At the Rio+20 summit in June 2012, the CCAC and the World Bank joined New York City Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg, Chair of the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, former U.S. President Bill Clinton, and Rio de Janeiro Mayor Eduardo Paes to announce the launch of the *Solid Waste Network* to help cities reduce methane emissions through solid waste management.¹⁶¹ At the UN climate change talks in Doha in December 2012, ministers from the CCAC partner countries pledged to dramatically reduce emissions of SLCPs.¹⁶² In May 2012, at the Camp David Summit, the G8 nations pledged to join and support increasing near-term climate mitigation ambition through the CCAC and other international cooperative initiatives.¹⁶³ In January 2013, over a dozen ministers issued a statement calling on oil and gas companies to work with the CCAC to substantially reduce venting, leakage, and flaring of natural gas from oil and gas operations worldwide.¹⁶⁴ In March 2013, ten major cities from every region of the world joined the CCAC Municipal Solid Waste Initiative, and dozens of additional cities are expected to join by the end of this year.¹⁶⁵ In April, the G8 Foreign Ministers affirmed that the “G8 remain fully committed to the UNFCCC process; ... [and] to increase mitigation ambition in the pre-2020 timeframe, including through international cooperative initiatives such as the Climate and Clean Air Coalition....”¹⁶⁶

The CCAC is managing a dedicated Trust Fund with an initial contribution of \$16.7 million from the U.S., Canada, Sweden, Netherlands, Germany, Norway, Denmark and the European Commission.¹⁶⁷ Canada announced an additional \$10 million contribution to the CCAC in April 2013.¹⁶⁸ The World Bank indicated that it has committed approximately USD \$30 billion (nearly 13% of overall lending commitments) to SLCP-relevant activities over fiscal years 2007-12.¹⁶⁹ Going forward, the World

Primer on Short-Lived Climate Pollutants

Bank proposes to expand SLCP-relevant activities to 15% by 2015 and 20% by 2020.¹⁷⁰ G8 leaders commissioned the World Bank to prepare a report on ways to integrate reductions of SLCPs into their activities and to assess funding options for methane reductions.¹⁷¹

Table 3: CCAC Partners (as of March 2013)¹⁷²

Country Partners	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Australia • Bangladesh • Canada • Chile • Colombia • Cote d'Ivoire • Denmark • Dominican Republic • Ethiopia • Finland • France • Germany • Ghana • Israel • Italy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Japan • Jordan • Mexico • Netherlands • New Zealand • Nigeria • Norway • Peru • Poland • Republic of Korea • Republic of Maldives • Sweden • Switzerland • United Kingdom • United States of America
Inter-Governmental Partners	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • European Commission • World Bank • UN Environment Programme 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UN Development Programme • UN Industrial Development Organization
Non-Governmental Partners	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bellona Foundation • Caucasus Environmental NGO Network • Center for Clean Air Policy • Center for Human Rights & Environment • Clean Air Initiative for Asian Cities • Clean Air Institute • Clean Air Task Force • ClimateWorks Foundation • Earthjustice • Environmental Defense Fund • Environmental Investigation Agency • EvK2CNR Committee • Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves • Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies • Institute for Global Environmental Strategies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institute for Governance & Sustainable Development • International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development • International Council on Clean Transportation • International Cryosphere Climate Initiative • International Institute for Sustainable Development • International Union of Air Pollution Prevention and Environmental Protection Associations • Molina Center for Strategic Studies in Energy & the Environment • Natural Resources Defense Council • Regional Environmental Center • Stockholm Environment Institute

Other Regional and Global SLCP Mitigation Initiatives

In addition to the CCAC there are a number of other global and regional initiatives that target SLCPs. For example, the Executive Body of the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP) recently approved an amendment to the Gothenburg Protocol adopting new PM requirements and including specific language on black carbon, making it the first international treaty to act on the link between air pollution and climate change.¹⁷³ The Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves and the Global Methane Initiative are both specifically targeting some of the largest global sources of black carbon and methane emissions.¹⁷⁴ UNEP's Atmospheric Brown Cloud program is also addressing black carbon and tropospheric ozone, with a focus on Asia and plans to expand to Latin America and Africa.¹⁷⁵ Finally, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) is currently considering whether to control black carbon emissions from ships¹⁷⁶ and recently completed an investigation on control measures to reduce black carbon from international shipping.¹⁷⁷ The Arctic Environment Ministers recently called for "urgent action" to reduce SLCPs to protect the Arctic and reduce the risk of feedback mechanisms that accelerate warming and lead to irreversible impacts, and encouraged the Arctic Council to consider a new "instrument or other arrangements to enhance efforts to reduce emissions of black carbon from the Arctic States" for decision at the 2015 Arctic Ministerial meeting.¹⁷⁸ And, as noted previously, the EU is moving forward with new regulations on HFCs.¹⁷⁹

National SLCP Mitigation Initiatives

There are a number of ongoing national initiatives to reduce individual SLCPs, including national laws addressing air

pollutants, as well as laws addressing HFCs, several of which are described above.¹⁸⁰ In the US, NGOs are calling for an Inter-Agency Task Force to Reduce SLCPs, using existing authorities to identify and implement rapid mitigation strategies and best practices for SLCPs inside and outside the US government.¹⁸¹

Conclusion

Reducing SLCPs will reduce near-term climate impacts, including sea-level rise, slow dangerous feedbacks, allow more time to adapt, and reduce the risk of passing tipping points that could lead to irreversible climate damage. In addition to providing near-term climate benefits, cutting SLCPs would also provide major benefits for human health and food security, would contribute to sustainable development goals, and would protect the significant gains in poverty reduction that otherwise will be reversed by near-term climate change impacts.¹⁸² Cutting SLCPs to achieve near-term climate benefits is an important complement to reducing CO₂ emissions—indeed, cutting SLCPs builds a broader on-ramp to more aggressive CO₂ mitigation. But SLCP reductions are not a substitute for the immediate action urgently needed to reduce CO₂. Reducing both CO₂ and SLCPs provides the best chance of limiting global temperature rise to below 2°C through 2100; aggressive mitigation of CO₂ can avoid 1.1°C of warming by the end of the century, and aggressive mitigation of SLCPs also can avoid 1.1°C in this timeframe.¹⁸³ As highlighted by Nobel Laureate Mario Molina and co-authors, regulatory measures in dedicated venues such as the Montreal Protocol are often the preferred way to reduce SLCPs.¹⁸⁴

Endnotes

¹ Forster P. *et al.* (2007) *Changes in Atmospheric Constituents and in Radiative Forcing*, in Solomon S. *et al.* (2007) *Climate Change 2007: Physical Science Basis*, Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Figure 2.21.

² *Id.*

³ The science of SLCPs dates back to the 1970s. See e.g., Ramanathan V. (1975) *Greenhouse effect due to chlorofluorocarbons: climatic implications*, SCI. 190:50; see also Wang *et al.* (1976) *Greenhouse effects due to man-made perturbations of trace gases*, SCI. 194:685. A major WMO-UNEP-NASA-NOAA report in 1985 concluded that non-CO₂ greenhouse gases in the atmosphere are adding to the greenhouse effect by an amount comparable to the effect of CO₂. Ramanathan *et al.* (1985) *Trace gas trends and their potential role in climate change*, J. GEOPHYS. RES. 90:5547. This finding has been confirmed and strengthened in the following decades by hundreds of studies culminating in IPCC reports (IPCC (1990) Overview Chapter, in IPCC (1990) *First Assessment Report*; IPCC (1995) *IPCC (1995) Second Assessment Report: Climate Change 1995*; IPCC (2001) *Third Assessment Report: Climate Change 2001*; and IPCC (2007) *CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT*.) In short, researchers have had at least 25 years to carefully develop the science of SLCPs and assess the findings. Bond *et al.* is the most recent assessment in this field. Bond T. C. *et al.* (2013) *Bounding the role of black carbon in the climate system: a scientific assessment*, Accepted for publication in the J. OF GEOPHYS. RES. – ATMOS., DOI:10.1002/jgrd.50171.

⁴ Ramanathan V. & Xu Y. (2010) *THE COPENHAGEN ACCORD FOR LIMITING GLOBAL WARMING: CRITERIA, CONSTRAINTS, AND AVAILABLE AVENUES*, PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. USA 107:8055, 8056 (“CO₂ (1.65 Wm⁻²) and the non-CO₂ GHGs (1.35 Wm⁻²) have added 3 (range: 2.6–3.5) Wm⁻² of radiant energy since preindustrial times.... The 3 Wm⁻² energy should have led to a warming of 2.4 °C (14). The observed warming trend (as of 2005) is only about 0.75 °C (15), or 30% of the expected warming. Observations of trends in ocean heat capacity (16) as well as coupled ocean–atmosphere models suggest that about 20% (0.5 °C warming) is still stored in the oceans (17). The rest of the 50% involves aerosols or particles added by air pollution.”).

⁵ Hu A. *et al.* (2013) *Mitigation of short-lived climate pollutants slows sea-level rise*, NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE, advanced online publication. (“By 2050, on the other hand, the SLCPs reduce projected warming by 0.6°C and CO₂ only about 0.1°C.”); *see also* Shindell D. *et al.* (2012) *Simultaneously mitigating near-term climate change and improving human health and food security*, SCI. 335(6065):183-189, 183. (“We identified 14 measures targeting methane and BC emissions that reduce projected global mean warming ~0.5°C by 2050.”); Bond, *et al.*, and accompanying press release. Bond T. C. *et al.* (2013) *Bounding the role of black carbon in the climate system: a scientific assessment*, Accepted for publication in the J. OF GEOPHYS. RES. –ATMOS., DOI:10.1002/jgrd.50171; and American Geophysical Union (2013) *Black carbon is much larger cause of climate change than previously assessed*, press release.

⁶ *See* United Nations Environment Programme & World Meteorological Organization (herein after UNEP/WMO) (2011) *Integrated Assessment of Black Carbon and Tropospheric Ozone*, Table 5.2.

⁷ During the past half century, the rate of global warming has been about 0.13°C per decade. Solomon S. *et al.* (2007) *TECHNICAL*

SUMMARY *in* CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 36. The rate of warming in the Arctic is currently at least twice the global average and in the Himalayas and Tibet three times the average. Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (2011) SNOW, WATER, ICE AND PERMAFROST IN THE ARCTIC, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND KEY MESSAGE, 4. Average global surface temperatures have increased by 0.8°C, over the 1880–1920 average, and under business-as-usual it could increase by an additional 2°C by 2070. Hansen J. *et al.* (2010) *Global surface temperature change*, REV. GEOPHYS. 48:4004; Solomon S. *et al.* (2007) TECHNICAL SUMMARY *in* CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 36; and UNEP/WMO (2011) INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF BLACK CARBON AND TROPOSPHERIC OZONE.

⁸ Mitigation of 1.1°C derived from Table 1 projected warming between 2005 and 2100 from SLCP only mitigation (1.1°C) compared to BAU (3.5°C). Hu A. *et al.* (2013) *Mitigation of short-lived climate pollutants slows sea-level rise*, NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE, advanced online publication.

⁹ For analysis of these impacts see Schneider, S. H. *et al.* (2007) ASSESSING KEY VULNERABILITIES AND THE RISK FROM CLIMATE CHANGE, *in* Parry M. L. *et al.* (2007) CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 779-810; and IPCC (2012) MANAGING THE RISKS OF EXTREME EVENTS AND DISASTERS TO ADVANCE CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION. A SPECIAL REPORT OF WORKING GROUPS I AND II OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE.

¹⁰ Hu A. *et al.* (2013) *Mitigation of short-lived climate pollutants slows sea-level rise*, NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE, advanced online publication. (“The SLCP mitigation would contribute about 24%

of the SLRfull rate reduction [in 2100].... With both the CO₂ and the SLCP mitigation, the projected SLR_{full} (from 2005 to 2100) is reduced by 31% from the BAU case; about 9% of that 31% is due to CO₂ mitigation and the balance of 22% is due to SLCPs.”).

¹¹ Climate and Clean Air Coalition to Reduce Short Lived Climate Pollutants, [About](#).

¹² Press Release, G8, [Camp David Declaration](#) (19 May 2012); and Press Release, US Dept. of State, [G8 Foreign Ministers' Meeting Statement](#) (11 April 2013).

¹³ Press Release, US Dept. of State, [G8 Foreign Ministers' Meeting Statement](#) (11 April 2013) (“Ministers recognised the ambitious measures already undertaken to reduce greenhouse gases, noting that action needs to continue and intensify as a matter of urgency. Ministers remain committed to long term efforts with a view to limiting effectively the increase in global average temperature below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, consistent with science. The G8 remain fully committed ... increase mitigation ambition in the pre-2020 timeframe, including through international cooperative initiatives such as the Climate and Clean Air Coalition; and to the developed countries’ goal of mobilising jointly USD 100bn per year by 2020, from a wide variety of public and private sources, in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation.”).

¹⁴ United Nations (2012) [RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY: THE FUTURE WE WANT](#), A/RES/66/288.

¹⁵ [Proposed Amendment to the Montreal Protocol](#) (submitted by the Federated States of Micronesia) (16 April 2013).

¹⁶ [Proposed Amendment to the Montreal Protocol](#) (submitted by the United States, Canada, and Mexico) (16 April 2013).

¹⁷ UNEP (2010) [Declaration on the global transition away from hydrochlorofluorocarbons \(HCFCs\) and chlorofluorocarbons \(CFCs\)](#); *see also* UNEP (2011) [Report of the combined ninth meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Vienna Convention](#)

on the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the Twenty-Third Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer; *and* UNEP (2012) Report of the Twenty-Fourth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer: Advance Copy.

¹⁸ European Commission (2012) Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on fluorinated greenhouse gases, COM(2012)0643 final; European Parliament, Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (2013) Draft Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on fluorinated greenhouse gases, 2012/0305(COD); *and* Schwarz W. *et al.* (2011) PREPARATORY STUDY FOR A REVIEW OF REGULATION (EC) No 842/2006 ON CERTAIN FLUORINATED GREENHOUSE GASES: FINAL REPORT.

¹⁹ Consumer Goods Forum (2012) Better Lives Through Better Business, 10; *see also* The Consumer Goods Forum, Sustainability Pillar; *and* Refrigerants, Naturally!, What we do.

²⁰ Solomon S. *et al.* (2007) Climate Change 2007: Physical Science Basis, Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“While more than half of the CO₂ emitted is currently removed from the atmosphere within a century ... about 20% ... remains ... for many millennia.”); *see also* Archer D *et al.* (2009) Atmospheric lifetime of fossil fuel carbon dioxide, ANNU. REV. EARTH PLANET. SCI. 37:117-34 (“Equilibration with the ocean will absorb most of it [CO₂] on a timescale of 2 to 20 centuries. Even if this equilibration were allowed to run to completion, a substantial fraction of the CO₂, 20-40%, would remain in the atmosphere awaiting slower chemical reactions with CaCO₃ and igneous rocks.”); Matthews H. D. & Caldeira K. (2008) Stabilizing climate requires near-zero emissions, J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. 35(4) (“[W]hile approximately half of the carbon emitted is removed by the natural carbon cycle within a century, a substantial fraction

of anthropogenic CO₂ will persist in the atmosphere for several millennia.”); and Hansen J. *et al.* (2007) [*Climate change and trace gases*](#), PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC. 365:1925-1954 (“About one-quarter of fossil fuel CO₂ emissions will stay in the air “forever”, i.e. more than 500 years.... Resulting climate changes would be ... irreversible.”).

²¹ Hu A. *et al.* (2013) [*Mitigation of short-lived climate pollutants slows sea-level rise*](#), NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE, advanced online publication (“By the end of the twenty-first century, the effect of CO₂ mitigation on temperature increases by tenfold to ~1.1°C compared with the mitigation of 0.1°C by 2050.”); *see also* UNEP/WMO (2011) [*Integrated Assessment of Black Carbon and Tropospheric Ozone*](#), 241 (“For example, mitigation of 0.15°C due to CO₂ measures takes place only around 2050 (Figure 6.1) under the CO₂ measures scenario; 30 years after emissions begin to decline rapidly. The influence of the CO₂ reductions grows rapidly, however, so that they mitigate roughly 0.5°C by 2070. Hence a delay of 20 years in implementation of those CO₂ reductions would mean that only ~0.15°C of warming mitigation relative to the reference scenario would be achieved within the 2070 timeframe examined here. Thus delayed CO₂ measures plus all the near-term measures examined here would lead to warming of about 2.1°C in 2070 rather than the 1.75°C shown in Figure 6.1. Conversely, a delay in reducing emissions of short-lived species would have a large impact on near-term warming rates, but little effect on 2070 temperatures (see Figure 5.12).”).

²² Hu A. *et al.* (2013) [*Mitigation of short-lived climate pollutants slows sea-level rise*](#), NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE, advanced online publication. (“By the end of the twenty-first century, the effect of CO₂ mitigation on temperature increases by tenfold to ~1.1°C compared with the mitigation of 0.1°C by 2050. This, in conjunction with the SLCP mitigation, is sufficient to avoid reaching the 2°C threshold until 2100.”). Mitigation of 2.3°C

derived from Table 1 projected warming between 2005 and 2100 from full mitigation (1.2°C) compared to BAU (3.5°C).

²³ U.S. Env'tl. Prot. Agency (2012) [Report to Congress on Black Carbon](#); see also UNEP/WMO (2011) [Integrated Assessment of Black Carbon and Tropospheric Ozone](#).

²⁴ U.S. Env'tl. Prot. Agency (2012) [Report to Congress on Black Carbon](#); see also UNEP/WMO (2011) [Integrated Assessment of Black Carbon and Tropospheric Ozone](#).

²⁵ Bond T. C. *et al.* (2013) *Bounding the role of black carbon in the climate system: a scientific assessment*, Accepted for publication in the J. OF GEOPHYS. RES. –ATMOS., doi:10.1002/jgrd.50171 (“We estimate that black carbon, with a total climate forcing of +1.1 W m⁻², is the second most important human emission in terms of its climate-forcing in the present-day atmosphere; only carbon dioxide is estimated to have a greater forcing.”). This study confirms earlier estimates by Jacobson (2001) and Ramanathan and Carmichael (2008), which also concluded that black carbon is the second largest contributor to global warming after CO₂. See Jacobson M. Z. (2001) *Strong radiative heating due to the mixing state of black carbon in atmospheric aerosols*, NAT. 409:695–69; and Ramanathan V. & Carmichael G. (2008) *Global and regional climate changes due to black carbon*, NAT. GEOSCI. 1:221. See also U.S. Env'tl. Prot. Agency (2012) [REPORT TO CONGRESS ON BLACK CARBON](#), 4, 18 (“The sum of the direct and snow/ice albedo effects of BC on the global scale is likely comparable to or larger than the forcing effect from methane, but less than the effect of carbon dioxide; however, there is more uncertainty in the forcing estimates for BC....”).

²⁶ Bond T. C. *et al.* (2013) *Bounding the role of black carbon in the climate system: a scientific assessment*, Accepted for publication in the J. OF GEOPHYS. RES. –ATMOS., doi:10.1002/jgrd.50171 (“The best estimate of industrial-era climate forcing of black carbon through all forcing mechanisms, including clouds

and cryosphere forcing, is $+1.1 \text{ W m}^{-2}$ with 90% uncertainty bounds of $+0.17$ to $+2.1 \text{ W m}^{-2}$. “).

²⁷ Janssen N. AH *et al.* (2012) *Health effects of black carbon*, World Health Organization; *see also* Smith K. R. *et al.* (2009) *Public health benefits of strategies to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions: health implications of short-lived greenhouse pollutants*, THE LANCET 274(9707):2091-2103.

²⁸ U.S. Env'tl. Prot. Agency (2012) [REPORT TO CONGRESS ON BLACK CARBON](#).

²⁹ Bond T. C. *et al.* (2013) *Bounding the role of black carbon in the climate system: a scientific assessment*, Accepted for publication in the J. OF GEOPHYS. RES. –ATMOS., doi:10.1002/jgrd.50171 (“With this method, a bottom-up estimate of total global emissions in the year 2000 is about 7500 Gg BC yr⁻¹, with an uncertainty range of 2000 to 29000 Gg yr⁻¹.”); *see also* U.S. Env'tl. Prot. Agency (2012) [REPORT TO CONGRESS ON BLACK CARBON](#).

³⁰ Bond T. C. *et al.* (2013) *Bounding the role of black carbon in the climate system: a scientific assessment*, Accepted for publication in the J. OF GEOPHYS. RES. –ATMOS.; *see also* U.S. Env'tl. Prot. Agency (2012) [REPORT TO CONGRESS ON BLACK CARBON](#).

³¹ Bond T. C. *et al.* (2013) *Bounding the role of black carbon in the climate system: a scientific assessment*, Accepted for publication in the J. OF GEOPHYS. RES. –ATMOS.; *see also* U.S. Env'tl. Prot. Agency (2012) [REPORT TO CONGRESS ON BLACK CARBON](#).

³² Bond T. C. *et al.* (2013) *Bounding the role of black carbon in the climate system: a scientific assessment*, Accepted for publication in the J. OF GEOPHYS. RES. –ATMOS. (“Major sources of BC, ranked in order of increasing POA:BC [primary organic aerosol:black carbon] ratio, are diesel vehicles, residential burning of coal, small industrial kilns and boilers, burning of wood and other biomass for cooking and heating, and all open burning of biomass. A few of these sources also emit significant quantities of SO₂.”).

³³ Andreae M. O. and Ramanathan V. (2013) [Climate's dark forcings](#), SCI 340(6130):280-281 (“the atmosphere contains light-absorbing organic or “brown” carbon (BrC) (3). BrC may account for 15 to 50% of light absorption in the atmosphere and in snow and ice (1, 4, 5) and has different optical properties and source and sink patterns from BC. In addition to combustion sources, especially biomass burning, BrC is also produced by atmospheric chemical reactions, a source not considered in emission inventories. BrC is sometimes included implicitly in climate models constrained by BC measurements, because different BC measurement techniques may include some or all BrC. However, most models have ignored BrC absorption and, as a result, concluded that the combination of BC and nonabsorbing organic carbon leads to net cooling.”); *see also* Bond T. C. *et al.* (2013) [Bounding the role of black carbon in the climate system: a scientific assessment](#), Accepted for publication in the J. OF GEOPHYS. RES. –ATMOS., DOI:10.1002/jgrd.50171; Feng Y., *et al.* (2013) [Brown carbon: a significant atmospheric absorber of solar radiation?](#), ATMOS. CHEM. PHYS. DISCUSS. 13:2795-2833; and Bahadur R., *et al.* (2012) [Solar absorption by elemental and brown carbon determined from spectral observations](#), PROC. NATL. ACAD. SCI. 109(43):17366-17371.

³⁴ Andreae M. O. and Ramanathan V. (2013) [Climate's dark forcings](#), SCI 340(6130):280-281 (“BrC is sometimes included implicitly in climate models constrained by BC measurements, because different BC measurement techniques may include some or all BrC. However, most models have ignored BrC absorption and, as a result, concluded that the combination of BC and nonabsorbing organic carbon leads to net cooling.”).

³⁵ Chung C. E., Ramanathan V., & Decremere D. (2012) [Observationally constrained estimates of carbonaceous aerosol radiative forcing](#), PROC. NATL. ACAD. SCI. USA, 109(29):11624-1162 (“10.4.1.12 Forcing by light-absorbing organic carbon, known

as brown carbon, has not been explicitly considered here, although some of the models listed in Table 10.2 assume a small amount of absorption. Carbonaceous aerosols (CA) emitted by fossil and biomass fuels consist of black carbon (BC), a strong absorber of solar radiation, and organic matter (OM). OM scatters as well as absorbs solar radiation. The absorbing component of OM, which is ignored in most climate models, is referred to as brown carbon (BrC)... Organic aerosol was known to cool the planet significantly. The OM forcing estimated by the [IPCC AR4] models was negative, about -0.1 to -0.4 Wm^{-2} . By integrating and analyzing aerosol observations, we have shown here that organic aerosol, because of the warming effects of brown carbon, neither cools nor warms the planet. We attribute the negative bias in the modeling studies primarily to the neglect of the 20% absorption caused by BrC, particularly over biomass-burning regions in Asia, Africa, and South America.”); *see also* Feng Y., Ramanathan V. & Kotamarthi V. R. (2013) *Brown carbon: a significant atmospheric absorber of solar radiation*, *ATMOS. CHEM. & PHYS. DISC.* 13:2795-2833.

³⁶ Bond T. C. *et al.* (2013) *Bounding the role of black carbon in the climate system: a scientific assessment*, Accepted for publication in the *J. OF GEOPHYS. RES. –ATMOS.*, DOI:10.1002/jgrd.50171 (“Light-absorbing particles in snow can significantly reduce snow albedo. Because of the high albedo of snow, even aerosol with relatively high single-scatter albedo (*e.g.*, aerosol with a high OA:BC ratio) causes positive radiative forcing.”).

³⁷ *Id.*

³⁸ *Id.* (“Evidence supporting the link between particles and adverse respiratory and cardiovascular health continues to mount. High human exposures to particulate matter in urban settings are linked to sources that emit black carbon and to intense exposures in indoor air. Thus, reducing particulate matter is desirable to improve human welfare, regardless of whether those reductions reduce climate warming.”) (internal citations omitted).

³⁹ U.S. Env'tl. Prot. Agency (2013) [Draft Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990 – 2011](#), Table ES-2.

⁴⁰ U.S. Env'tl. Prot. Agency (2012) [Report to Congress on Black Carbon](#).

⁴¹ UNEP UNEP/WMO (2011) [Integrated Assessment of Black Carbon and Tropospheric Ozone](#).

⁴² Solomon S. *et al.* (2007) [Climate Change 2007: Physical Science Basis](#), Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 129, 132.

⁴³ US EPA (2010) METHANE AND NITROUS OXIDE EMISSIONS FROM NATURAL SOURCES, ES-2 (“Natural sources of CH₄ are estimated to produce 37 percent of the total CH₄ flux into the atmosphere every year.”).

⁴⁴ UNEP UNEP/WMO (2011) [Integrated Assessment of Black Carbon and Tropospheric Ozone](#).

⁴⁵ Solomon S. *et al.* (2007) [Technical Summary in Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis](#), Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Figure TS.5.

⁴⁶ UNEP/WMO (2011) [Integrated Assessment of Black Carbon and Tropospheric Ozone](#). (“Without implementation of measures beyond current and planned regulations, methane (CH₄) emissions are expected to increase in the future. Increased coal mining and oil and gas production, coupled with growth in agricultural activities and municipal waste generation, are likely to lead to more than 25 per cent higher global anthropogenic CH₄ emissions by 2030 relative to 2005. The projected increase in fossil fuel production is the main driving force behind this growth.”).

⁴⁷ *Id.*

⁴⁸ *Id.*; see also U.S. Env'tl. Prot. Agency (2003) [Ozone: good up high bad nearby](#).

⁴⁹ UNEP (2011) [Near-term Climate Protection and Clean Air Benefits: Actions for Controlling Short-Lived Climate Forcers](#); *see also* Reilly J. *et al.* (2007) *Global economic effects of changes in crops, pasture, and forests due to changing climate, carbon dioxide, and ozone*, ENERGY POLICY 35(11):5370-5283.

⁵⁰ Reducing other ozone precursors can have varying effects on the climate, for example cutting non-methane VOCs can provide some additional cooling but reducing NO_x is predicted to produce warming due to its importance for removing methane from the atmosphere. UNEP/WMO (2011) [Integrated Assessment of Black Carbon and Tropospheric Ozone](#), 57 (“Two-thirds of the O₃ radiative forcing to date may be attributed to the increase in atmospheric CH₄ over the last century, and hence CH₄ emissions are responsible for a large part of the increase.”).

⁵¹ *Id.*

⁵² UNEP (2011) [HFCs: A Critical Link in Protecting Climate and the Ozone Layer](#).

⁵³ U.S. Env'tl. Prot. Agency (2013) [DRAFT INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990 – 2011](#), Table ES-2 (between 2010 and 2011 U.S. emissions of HFCs increased from 121.3 to 129.0 million metric tons CO₂-eq, an increase of ~6%. U.S. CO₂ emissions between 2010 and 2011 shrank from 5,711.1 to 5,604.9 million metric tonnes, a decrease of ~1.9%).

⁵⁴ UNEP (2011) [HFCs: A Critical Link in Protecting Climate and the Ozone Layer](#).

⁵⁵ *Id.*

⁵⁶ Hu A. *et al.* (2013) [Mitigation of short-lived climate pollutants slows sea-level rise](#), NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE, advanced online publication. (“By the end of the twenty-first century, the effect of CO₂ mitigation on temperature increases by tenfold to ~1.1°C compared with the mitigation of 0.1°C by 2050.... In the CO₂ mitigation case, CO₂ emissions are reduced as in RCP2.6 with CO₂ concentration peaking at 440 ppm by mid-twenty-first century and reducing to 420 ppm at the end of the twenty-first century.”).

⁵⁷ *Id.*

⁵⁸ Solomon S. *et al.* (2007) [CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS](#), Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“While more than half of the CO₂ emitted is currently removed from the atmosphere within a century ... about 20% ... remains ... for many millennia.”); Archer D *et al.* (2009) [Atmospheric lifetime of fossil fuel carbon dioxide](#), ANNU. REV. EARTH PLANET. SCI. 37:117-34 (“Equilibration with the ocean will absorb most of it [CO₂] on a timescale of 2 to 20 centuries. Even if this equilibration were allowed to run to completion, a substantial fraction of the CO₂, 20-40%, would remain in the atmosphere awaiting slower chemical reactions with CaCO₃ and igneous rocks.”); Matthews H. D. & Caldeira K. (2008) [Stabilizing climate requires near-zero emissions](#), J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. 35(4) (“[W]hile approximately half of the carbon emitted is removed by the natural carbon cycle within a century, a substantial fraction of anthropogenic CO₂ will persist in the atmosphere for several millennia.”); and Hansen J. *et al.* (2007) [Climate change and trace gases](#), PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC. 365:1925-1954 (“About one-quarter of fossil fuel CO₂ emissions will stay in the air “forever”, i.e. more than 500 years.... Resulting climate changes would be ... irreversible.”).

⁵⁹ Solomon S. *et al.* (2010) [Persistence of climate changes due to a range of greenhouse gases](#), PROC. NATL. ACAD. SCI. USA 107(43) (“[M]ultiple centuries are required to warm or cool the deep ocean.... Maintaining a forcing for a longer period of time transfers more heat to the deep ... ocean, with a correspondingly longer timescale for release of energy if emissions were to be halted.... [T]he slow timescales of the ocean imply that actions to mitigate the climate impacts of these warming agents [SLCPs] would be most effective if undertaken sooner; conversely such actions would become less effective the longer the radiative forcing is maintained.”)

⁶⁰ Solomon S. *et al.* (2011) *CLIMATE STABILIZATION TARGETS: EMISSIONS, CONCENTRATIONS, AND IMPACTS OVER DECADES TO MILLENNIA*, National Research Council.

⁶¹ CO₂'s long atmospheric lifetime combined with the thermal inertia of the ocean, which causes heat trapped in the oceans to be released over many centuries, means that if CO₂ emissions were to cease, while continued warming would slowly decrease, more than 80% of the temperature increase caused by CO₂ would persist for a 1,000 years of years. UNEP/WMO (2011) *Integrated Assessment of Black Carbon and Tropospheric Ozone*, 6 ("In the case of an SLCF this means that, when its concentration and hence its radiative forcing is reduced by emission controls, the global mean temperature will achieve most of its decrease towards a new equilibrium value in about a decade. About 10 per cent of the full decrease will not be realized for hundreds of years, since the redistribution of heat stored in the deep ocean while the SLCF was active, and hence its upwards transport, will continue for hundreds of years In the case of CO₂, more than 80 per cent of the expected decrease in global mean temperature after emission reductions will not be realized for hundreds of years. This is because the drawing down of atmospheric CO₂ into the deep ocean, and hence the decrease in its radiative forcing, is roughly offset by the upward transport of heat to the surface, since both phenomena are achieved by the same physics of deep-ocean mixing....") *citing* Solomon S. *et al.* (2009) *Irreversible climate change due to carbon dioxide emissions*, PROC. NATL. ACAD. SCI. USA 106:1704, 1704 ("[C]limate change that takes place due to increases in carbon dioxide concentration is largely irreversible for 1,000 years after emissions stop. Following cessation of emissions, removal of atmospheric carbon dioxide decreases radiative forcing, but is largely compensated by slower loss of heat to the ocean, so that atmospheric temperatures do not drop significantly for at least 1,000 years."); *and* Matthews D & Weaver J. (2010) *Committed climate warming*, NAT. GEOSCI. 3:142.

⁶² Solomon S. *et al.* (2011) [CLIMATE STABILIZATION TARGETS: EMISSIONS, CONCENTRATIONS, AND IMPACTS OVER DECADES TO MILLENNIA](#), National Research Council (“Climate changes that occur because of carbon dioxide increases are expected to persist for thousands of years even if emissions were to be halted at any point in time.”); Solomon S. *et al.* (2010) [Persistence of climate changes due to a range of greenhouse gases](#), PROC. NATL. ACAD. SCI. USA 107(43) (“a simplified way to view future warming persistence is that emissions of CO₂ and a handful of other extremely long-lived gases imply warming that is essentially irreversible on human timescales without geoengineering or active sequestration.”); Solomon S. *et al.* (2009) [Irreversible climate change due to carbon dioxide emissions](#), PROC. NATL. ACAD. SCI. USA 106(6):1704-1709 (“Anthropogenic carbon dioxide will cause irrevocable sea level rise.... An assessed range of models suggests that the eventual contribution to sea level rise from thermal expansion of the ocean is expected to be 0.2–0.6 m per degree of global warming (5). Fig. 4 uses this range together with a best estimate for climate sensitivity of 3 °C (5) to estimate lower limits to eventual sea level rise due to thermal expansion alone. Fig. 4 shows that even with zero emissions after reaching a peak concentration, irreversible global average sea level rise of at least 0.4–1.0 m is expected if 21st century CO₂ concentrations exceed 600 ppmv and as much as 1.9 m for a peak CO₂ concentration exceeding 1,000 ppmv.”); Hansen J. *et al.* (2007) [Dangerous human-made interference with climate: a GISS modelE study](#), ATMOSP. CHEM. PHYS. 7:2287-2312 (“CO₂ emissions are the critical issue, because a substantial fraction of these emissions remain in the atmosphere “forever”, for practical purposes.... The principal implication is that avoidance of dangerous climate change requires the bulk of coal and unconventional fossil fuel resources to be exploited only under condition that CO₂ emissions are captured and sequestered.”).

⁶³ Solomon S. *et al.* (2009) *Irreversible climate change due to carbon dioxide emissions*, PROC. NATL. ACAD. SCI. USA 106(6):1704-1709.

⁶⁴ National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration, *TRENDS IN ATMOSPHERIC CARBON DIOXIDE*.

⁶⁵ Solomon S. *et al.* (2007) *Climate Change 2007: Physical Science Basis*, Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

⁶⁶ Solomon S. *et al.* (2009) *Irreversible climate change due to carbon dioxide emissions*, PROC. NATL. ACAD. SCI. USA 106(6):1704-1709.

⁶⁷ International Energy Agency (2012) *WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012*; and Edenhofer O., *et al.* (2009) *THE ECONOMICS OF DECARBONIZATION*. (“Stabilization requires a radical shift from conventional fossil to low-carbon energy sources, including renewables, carbon capture and storage (CCS), and, to a lesser extent, nuclear.... The relative importance of energy efficiency improvements, particularly in the short to medium term, increases with more ambitious stabilization levels and under more pessimistic assumptions about the availability of low-carbon technologies.”).

⁶⁸ B. Metz *et al.* (2007) *CLIMATE CHANGE: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE*, Contribution Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007, 19-22.

⁶⁹ International Energy Agency (2013) *TRACKING CLEAN ENERGY PROGRESS 2013*.

⁷⁰ International Energy Agency (2013) *TRACKING CLEAN ENERGY PROGRESS 2013*; *see also* Myhrvold N. P. & Caldeira K. (2012) *Greenhouse gases, climate change and the transition from coal to low-carbon electricity*, ENVIRON. RES. LET. 7:014019, 1 (“The use of current infrastructure to build this new low-emission system

necessitates additional emissions of greenhouse gases, and the coal-based infrastructure will continue to emit substantial amounts of greenhouse gases as it is phased out. Furthermore, ocean thermal inertia delays the climate benefits of emissions reductions.... We show that rapid deployment of low-emission energy systems can do little to diminish the climate impacts in the first half of this century.”).

⁷¹ UNEP/WMO (2011)–[INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF BLACK CARBON AND TROPOSPHERIC OZONE](#), 6, 159 (“In the case of an SLCF this means that, when its concentration and hence its radiative forcing is reduced by emission controls, the global mean temperature will achieve most of its decrease towards a new equilibrium value in about a decade. About 10 per cent of the full decrease will not be realized for hundreds of years, since the redistribution of heat stored in the deep ocean while the SLCF was active, and hence its upwards transport, will continue for hundreds of years.... Over the longer term, from 2070 onwards, there is still a reduction in warming in the early measures case, but the value becomes quite small. This reinforces the conclusions drawn from previous analyses that reducing emissions of O₃ precursors and BC can have substantial benefits in the near term, but that long-term climate change is much more dependent on emissions of long-lived GHGs such as CO₂.”).

⁷² Hu A. *et al.* (2013) [Mitigation of short-lived climate pollutants slows sea-level rise](#), NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE, advanced online publication. (“By 2050, on the other hand, the SLCPs reduce projected warming by 0.6°C and CO₂ only about 0.1°C.”); Shindell D. *et al.* (2012) [Simultaneously mitigating near-term climate change and improving human health and food security](#), SCI. 335(6065):183-18983, 183 (“We identified 14 measures targeting methane and BC emissions that reduce projected global mean warming ~0.5°C by 2050.”).

⁷³ See UNEP/WMO (2011) [Integrated Assessment of Black Carbon and Tropospheric Ozone](#), Table 5.2.

⁷⁴ Shindell D. *et al.* (2012) *Simultaneously mitigating near-term climate change and improving human health and food security*, SCI. 335(6065):183-189, 183, 185 (“We identified 14 measures targeting methane and BC emissions that reduce projected global mean warming $\sim 0.5^{\circ}\text{C}$ by 2050. *** BC albedo and direct forcings are large in the Himalayas, where there is an especially pronounced response in the Karakoram, and in the Arctic, where the measures reduce projected warming over the next three decades by approximately two thirds and where regional temperature response patterns correspond fairly closely to albedo forcing...”); *see also* UNEP/WMO (2011) *Integrated Assessment of Black Carbon and Tropospheric Ozone*, 3 (“If the measures were to be implemented by 2030, they could halve the potential increase in global temperature projected for 2050 compared to the Assessment’s reference scenario based on current policies and energy and fuel projections. *** This could reduce warming in the Arctic in the next 30 years by about two-thirds compared to the projections of the Assessment’s reference scenario”).

⁷⁵ Solomon S. *et al.* (2007) *Technical Summary in Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis*, Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 36 (“The rate of warming averaged over the last 50 years ($0.13^{\circ}\text{C} \pm 0.03^{\circ}\text{C}$ per decade) is nearly twice that for the last 100 years.”).

⁷⁶ Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (2011) *Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic*, Executive Summary and Key Message, 4 (“The increase in annual average temperature since 1980 has been twice as high over the Arctic as it has been over the rest of the world.”); *see also* Qiu J. (2008) *China: The third pole*, NAT. 454:393, 393, (“The proximate cause of the changes now being felt on the [Tibetan] plateau is a rise in temperature of up to 0.3°C a decade that has been going on for fifty years — approximately three times the global warming rate.”).

⁷⁷ Mitigation of 1.1°C derived from Table 1 projected warming between 2005 and 2100 from SLCP only mitigation (1.1°C) compared to BAU (3.5°C). Hu A. *et al.* (2013) [*Mitigation of short-lived climate pollutants slows sea-level rise*](#), NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE, advanced online publication.; *see also* Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies (2012) [*Short Lived Climate Forcers: Pathways to Action – Workshop Summary*](#) (“... inclusion of HFCs mitigation would further reduce the warming by another 20% (about 0.1°C), thus increasing the total reduction of warming between now and 2050 to about 0.6°C” (*citing* Ramanathan V. & Xu Y. (2010)); Ramanathan V & Xu Y. (2010) [*THE COPENHAGEN ACCORD FOR LIMITING GLOBAL WARMING: CRITERIA, CONSTRAINTS, AND AVAILABLE AVENUES*](#), PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. USA 107:8055, 8055 (“These actions [to reduce emissions of SLCPs including HFCs, methane, black carbon, and ground-level ozone], even if we are restricted to available technologies ... can reduce the probability of exceeding the 2°C barrier before 2050 to less than 10% and before 2100 to less than 50% [when CO₂ concentrations are stabilized below 441 ppm during this century].”).

⁷⁸ Ramanathan V. & Feng Y. (2008) [*On avoiding dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system: formidable challenges ahead*](#), PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. USA 105:14245; *see also* Schellnhuber H. J. (2008) [*Global warming: stop worrying, start panicking?*](#) PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. USA 105:14239.

⁷⁹ Ramanathan V & Xu Y. (2010) [*THE COPENHAGEN ACCORD FOR LIMITING GLOBAL WARMING: CRITERIA, CONSTRAINTS, AND AVAILABLE AVENUES*](#), PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. USA 107:8055.

⁸⁰ *Id.*

⁸¹ Hu A. *et al.* (2013) [*Mitigation of short-lived climate pollutants slows sea-level rise*](#), NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE, advanced online publication, Figure 1.

⁸² *Id.* (“If, for example, we postpone CH₄ and black carbon mitigation until 2030–2040 instead of 2015, the longer-term

warming increases by another 0.2°C and the pre-industrial to year 2100 warming will exceed 2°C by mid-century. According to the projections, the delayed actions can increase SLR by 9–11%.”).

⁸³ *Id.*, Adapted from Supplemental Materials Figure SF9.

⁸⁴ National Research Council of the National Academies (2011) [CLIMATE STABILIZATION TARGETS: EMISSIONS, CONCENTRATIONS, AND IMPACTS OVER DECADES TO MILLENNIA](#), 3; *see also* UNEP/WMO (2011) [Integrated Assessment of Black Carbon and Tropospheric Ozone](#); and United Nations Environment Program (2011) [NEAR-TERM CLIMATE PROTECTION AND CLEAN AIR BENEFITS: ACTIONS FOR CONTROLLING SHORT-LIVED CLIMATE FORCERS](#).

⁸⁵ National Research Council Committee on Abrupt Climate Change (2002) [ABRUPT CLIMATE CHANGE: INEVITABLE SURPRISES](#), 14 (The National Research Council provides two definitions for abrupt climate change. The first definition describes abrupt climate change in terms of physics: “an abrupt climate change occurs when the climate system is forced to cross some threshold, triggering a transition to a new state at a rate determined by the climate system itself and faster than the cause.” The second definition describes abrupt climate change in terms of impacts, “an abrupt change is one that takes place so rapidly and unexpectedly that human or natural systems have difficulty adapting to it.”).

⁸⁶ Mitigation of 0.7°C derived from Table 1 projected warming between 2005 and 2050 from full mitigation (0.9°C) compared to BAU (1.6°C); mitigation of 2.3°C is derived from full mitigation (1.2°C) compared to BAU (3.5°C) between 2005 and 2100. Hu A. *et al.* (2013) [Mitigation of short-lived climate pollutants slows sea-level rise](#), NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE, advanced online publication.

⁸⁷ Ramanathan V & Xu Y. (2010) [THE COPENHAGEN ACCORD FOR LIMITING GLOBAL WARMING: CRITERIA, CONSTRAINTS, AND AVAILABLE AVENUES](#), PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. USA 107:8055, 8055 (“These actions [to reduce emissions of SLCPs including HFCs, methane, black carbon, and ground-level ozone], even if we are restricted to

available technologies ... can reduce the probability of exceeding the 2°C barrier before 2050 to less than 10% and before 2100 to less than 50% [when CO₂ concentrations are stabilized below 441 ppm during this century]”); *see also* Hu A. *et al.* (2013) *Mitigation of short-lived climate pollutants slows sea-level rise*, NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE, advanced online publication; UNEP/WMO (2011) *INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF BLACK CARBON AND TROPOSPHERIC OZONE: SUMMARY FOR DECISIONS MAKERS*, 12 (“[T]he combination of CO₂, CH₄, and BC measures holds the temperature increase below 2°C until around 2070... [and] adoption of the Assessment’s near-term measures (CH₄ + BC) along with the CO₂ reductions would provide a substantial chance of keeping the Earth’s temperature increase below 1.5°C for the next 30 years.”); UNEP/WMO (2011) *INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF BLACK CARBON AND TROPOSPHERIC OZONE*, 240 (“Hence adoption of the near-term measures analyzed in this Assessment would increase the chances for society to keep the Earth’s temperature increase below 1.5°C for the next 40 years if these measures were phased in along with CO₂ reductions.”); *and* Shindell D. *et al.* (2012) *Simultaneously mitigating near-term climate change and improving human health and food security*, *SCI.* 335(6065):183-189, 184 (“The combination of CH₄ and BC measures along with substantial CO₂ emissions reductions [under a 450 parts per million (ppm) scenario] has a high probability of limiting global mean warming to <2°C during the next 60 years, something that neither set of emissions reductions achieves on its own....”).

⁸⁸ Shindell D. *et al.* (2012) *Simultaneously mitigating near-term climate change and improving human health and food security*, *SCI.* 335(6065):183-189; *and* UNEP/WMO (2011) *INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF BLACK CARBON AND TROPOSPHERIC OZONE*; based on Ramanathan V. & Xu Y. (2010) *THE COPENHAGEN ACCORD FOR LIMITING GLOBAL WARMING: CRITERIA, CONSTRAINTS, AND AVAILABLE AVENUES*, *PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. USA* 107: 8055.

⁸⁹ UNEP/WMO (2011) *Integrated Assessment of Black Carbon and Tropospheric Ozone*, 99 (“While global mean temperatures provide some indication of climate impacts and their simplicity makes them widely used indicators, temperature changes can vary dramatically from place to place.... In the case of the short-lived climate forcing by aerosols and O₃, the forcing itself is also very unevenly distributed, and hence can cause even greater regional contrasts in the temperature response.”); and Christensen, J. H. *et al.* (2007) *Regional Climate Projections, in Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis*.

⁹⁰ Qiu J. (2008) *China: The third pole*, NAT. 454:393, 393 (“The proximate cause of the changes now being felt on the [Tibetan] plateau is a rise in temperature of up to 0.3 °C a decade that has been going on for fifty years — approximately three times the global warming rate”); *see also* Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (2011) *SNOW, WATER, ICE AND PERMAFROST IN THE ARCTIC, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND KEY MESSAGE*, 4 (“The increase in annual average temperature since 1980 has been twice as high over the Arctic as it has been over the rest of the world”); and Cruz R. V. *et al.* (2007) *ASIA, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY*, 475 (“In all four regions [of Africa] and in all seasons, the median temperature increase [between 1980 and 2099] lies between 3°C and 4°C, roughly 1.5 times the global mean response.”).

⁹¹ Wallack J. S. and Ramanathan, V. (2009) *The other climate changes, why black carbon also matters*, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 88(5) (2009).

⁹² According to passive microwave data analyzed by the National Snow and Ice Data Center and NASA, on 16 September 2012 the Arctic reached a new record minimum of 1.32 million square miles, 18% less than the previous record minimum set in 2007 and nearly 50% less than the 1979 to 2000 average. National Snow & Ice Data Center, *Arctic sea ice extent settles a*

record seasonal minimum, (16 September 2012); and Derksen C. & Brown R. (2012) *Spring snow cover extent reductions in the 2008-2012 period exceeding climate model projections*, GEOPHYS. RES. LETT. 39(19).

⁹³ Flanner M. G. *et al.* (2011) *Radiative forcing and albedo feedback from the Northern Hemisphere cryosphere between 1979 and 2008*, NAT. GEOSCI. 4:151; *see also* Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (2011) *Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic*, Executive Summary and Key Message; and Stroeve J. *et al.* (2007) *Arctic sea ice decline: faster than forecast*, GEOPHYS. RES. LETT. 34:L09501.

⁹⁴ Lenton T. M. (2011) *2°C or not 2°C? That is the climate question*, NAT. 473(7).

⁹⁵ National Snow & Ice Data Center (2012) *Arctic sea ice settles at record seasonal minimum*, press release.

⁹⁶ Stroeve *et al.* (2012) *Trends in Arctic sea ice extent from CMIP5, CMIP3 and observations*, GEOPHYS. RES. LETT. 39:L16502. (“While quantification of the role of external forcing depends on many assumptions, it is nevertheless becoming increasingly clear in both the observations ... and model studies ... that if greenhouse gas concentrations continue to rise, the Arctic Ocean will eventually become seasonally icefree. However, results from the CMIP5 models do not appear to have appreciably reduced uncertainty as to when this may be realized. Nevertheless, CMIP5 arrives at a seasonally ice-free Arctic sooner than CMIP3, leading to the conclusion that a seasonally ice-free Arctic Ocean within the next few decades is a distinct possibility.”).

⁹⁷ Press Release, NASA, *Arctic sea ice hits smallest extent in satellite era* (19 September 2012).

⁹⁸ Press Release, NASA, *2013 Wintertime Arctic Sea Ice Maximum Fifth Lowest on Record* (3 April 2013).

⁹⁹ Callaghan T. V. *et al.* (2011) *Changing Permafrost and its Impacts*, in Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme

(2011) [Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic \(SWIPA\): Climate Change and the Cryosphere](#); and UNEP (2012) [Policy Implications of Warming Permafrost](#).

¹⁰⁰ Schuur E. A. G. et al. (2008) [Vulnerability of Permafrost Carbon to Climate Change: Implications for the Global Carbon Cycle](#), *BioSci.* 58(8) (“Overall, this permafrost C pool estimate is more than twice the size of the entire atmospheric C pool, and it is more than double previous estimates of high-latitude soil C....”); Callaghan T. V. et al. (2011) [CHANGING PERMAFROST AND ITS IMPACTS](#), in Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (2011) [SNOW, WATER, ICE AND PERMAFROST IN THE ARCTIC \(SWIPA\): CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE CRYOSPHERE](#) (“Furthermore, recent work has shown that carbon pools in permafrost soils are much larger than previously recognized: around 1400 to 1850 gigatonnes (Gt) of carbon are located in terrestrial permafrost regions.... In addition, Arctic coastal seas underlain by subsea permafrost host an extremely large carbon pool: the Arctic continental shelf could contain around 1300 Gt of carbon, of which 800 Gt is CH₄, some of which could be available for sudden release under the appropriate conditions. A release of only 1% of this reservoir would more than triple the atmospheric mixing ratio of CH₄, potentially triggering abrupt climate change.”); UNEP (2012) [POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF WARMING PERMAFROST](#) (“If the permafrost thaws, the organic matter will thaw and decay, potentially releasing large amounts of CO₂ and methane into the atmosphere. This organic material was buried and frozen thousands of years ago and its release into the atmosphere is irreversible on human time scales. Thawing permafrost could emit 43 to 135 Gt of CO₂ equivalent by 2100 and 246 to 415 Gt of CO₂ equivalent by 2200. Uncertainties are large, but emissions from thawing permafrost could start within the next few decades and continue for several centuries, influencing both short-term climate (before 2100) and long-term climate (after 2100).”); and Schaefer K et al. (2011)

Amount and timing of permafrost carbon release in response to climate warming, TELLUS B. 63(2):165-180.

¹⁰¹ Jacobson M. (2010) *Short-term effects of controlling fossil-fuel soot, biofuel soot and gases, and methane on climate, Arctic ice, and air pollution health*, J. GEOPHYS RES. 115:3795.

¹⁰² Menon S. *et al.* (2010) *Black carbon aerosols and the third polar ice cap*, ATMOS. CHEM. PHYS., 10:4559; *see also* Ramanathan V. *et al.* (2007) *Atmospheric brown clouds: Hemispherical and regional variations in long range transport, absorption, and radiative forcing*, J. OF GEOPHYS. RES., 12:D22S21; and UNEP/WMO (2011) *Integrated Assessment of Black Carbon and Tropospheric Ozone*.

¹⁰³ Shindell D. *et al.* (2012) *Simultaneously mitigating near-term climate change and improving human health and food security*, SCI. 335(6065):183-189, 183, 185 (“We identified 14 measures targeting methane and BC emissions that reduce projected global mean warming $\sim 0.5^{\circ}\text{C}$ by 2050. *** BC albedo and direct forcings are large in the Himalayas, where there is an especially pronounced response in the Karakoram, and in the Arctic, where the measures reduce projected warming over the next three decades by approximately two thirds and where regional temperature response patterns correspond fairly closely to albedo forcing...”); *see also* UNEP/WMO (2011) *Integrated Assessment of Black Carbon and Tropospheric Ozone: Summary for Decisions Makers*, 3 (“If the measures were to be implemented by 2030, they could halve the potential increase in global temperature projected for 2050 compared to the Assessment’s reference scenario based on current policies and energy and fuel projections. *** This could reduce warming in the Arctic in the next 30 years by about two-thirds compared to the projections of the Assessment’s reference scenario”).

¹⁰⁴ Menon S. *et al.* (2010) *Black carbon aerosols and the third polar ice cap*, ATMOS. CHEM. PHYS., 10:4559.

¹⁰⁵ Lim S. *et al.* (2012) [*A comparative risk assessment of burden of disease and injury attributable to 67 risk factors and risk factor clusters in 21 regions, 1990–2010: a systematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2010*](#), THE LANCET 380(9859): 2224 – 2260.

¹⁰⁶ Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, [Global Burden of Disease \(GDB\) Visualizations](#) (2013) (this website, launched in 2013, provides access to data and interactive visualizations of the findings of the 2010 Global Burden of Diseases, Injuries, and Risk Factors Study.); *see also* Lim S. *et al.* (2012) [*A comparative risk assessment of burden of disease and injury attributable to 67 risk factors and risk factor clusters in 21 regions, 1990–2010: a systematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2010*](#), THE LANCET 380(9859): 2224 – 2260.

¹⁰⁷ World Health Organization, [About the Global Burden of Disease \(GDB\) project](#) (2013) (The World Health Organization calculates the global burden of disease using disability-adjusted life year (DALY), which measures the combined years lost due to premature mortality, known as years of life lost (YLLs), and years of life lost due to time lived in states of less than full health, known as years lived with disability (YLD). One DALY is equal to one lost year of health life).

¹⁰⁸ Lim S. *et al.* (2012) [*A comparative risk assessment of burden of disease and injury attributable to 67 risk factors and risk factor clusters in 21 regions, 1990–2010: a systematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2010*](#), THE LANCET 380(9859): 2224 – 2260.

¹⁰⁹ Asian Development Bank (2012) [TOWARD AN ENVIRONMENTALLY SUSTAINABLE FUTURE COUNTRY ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA](#) (“The increased demand for energy, growing vehicular fleet, and industrial expansion have led to serious air quality deterioration in the PRC, which, in turn, has adverse effects on human health and

ecosystems. A recent study by the World Bank (2007) estimated that air pollution could be imposing annual economic costs in the PRC equivalent to as much as 1.2% of GDP based on cost-of-illness valuation and 3.8% of GDP based on willingness to pay”); *citing* World Bank (2007) [COST OF POLLUTION IN CHINA: ECONOMIC ESTIMATES OF PHYSICAL DAMAGES](#) (“Total health costs associated with air pollution are 1.2 percent (using AHC) and 3.8 percent (using VSL) of GDP.”).

¹¹⁰ Shindell D. *et al.* (2012) *Simultaneously mitigating near-term climate change and improving human health and food security*, *SCI.* 335(6065):183-18983, 183 (“This strategy avoids 0.7 to 4.7 million annual premature deaths from outdoor air pollution and increases annual crop yields by 30 to 135 million metric tons due to ozone reductions in 2030 and beyond.”); *see also* UNEP/WMO (2011) [Integrated Assessment of Black Carbon and Tropospheric Ozone: Summary for Decisions Makers](#); *and* UNEP (2011) *Near-term Climate Protection and Clean Air Benefits: Actions for Controlling Short-Lived Climate Forcers*.

¹¹¹ Anenberg *et al.* (2012) *Global air quality and health co-benefits of mitigating near-term climate change through methane and black carbon emission controls*, *ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES*, 120:831, 831, 838 (“We estimate that, for PM_{2.5} [black carbon] and ozone respectively, fully implementing these [14] measures could reduce global population-weighted average surface concentrations by 23-34% and 7-17% and avoid 0.6-4.4 and 0.04-0.52 million annual premature deaths globally in 2030. More than 80% of the health benefits are estimated to occur in Asia.... Based on our estimates, avoided deaths would represent 1-8% of cardiopulmonary and lung cancer deaths among those age 30 years and older, and 1-7% of all deaths for all ages, assuming constant baseline mortality rates.”).

¹¹² UNEP/WMO (2011) [Integrated Assessment of Black Carbon and Tropospheric Ozone: Summary for Decisions Makers](#), 3 (“Full implementation of the identified measures could avoid

the loss of 52 million tonnes (within a range of 30–140 million tonnes), 1–4 per cent, of the global production of maize, rice, soybean and wheat each year.”).

¹¹³ Ramanathan V. & Carmichael G. (2008) *Global and regional climate changes due to black carbon*, NAT. GEOSCI. 1:221.

¹¹⁴ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2012) [Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation: Summary for Policymakers](#). (“**[Precipitation]** There have been statistically significant trends in the number of heavy precipitation events in some regions. It is *likely* that more of these regions have experienced increases than decreases, although there are strong regional and subregional variations in these trends. ... **[Tropical Cyclones]** There is *low confidence* in any observed long-term (i.e., 40 years or more) increases in tropical cyclone activity (i.e., intensity, frequency, duration), after accounting for past changes in observing capabilities. It is *likely* that there has been a poleward shift in the main Northern and Southern Hemisphere extratropical storm tracks... **[Flooding]** There is *limited to medium evidence* available to assess climate-driven observed changes in the magnitude and frequency of floods at regional scales because the available instrumental records of floods at gauge stations are limited in space and time, and because of confounding effects of changes in land use and engineering. Furthermore, there is *low agreement* in this evidence, and thus overall *low confidence* at the global scale regarding even the sign of these changes.... **[Coastal High Water]** It is *likely* that there has been an increase in extreme coastal high water related to increases in mean sea level.”). The bold words are added for clarity.

¹¹⁵ The large range for 21st century sea-level rise highlights the uncertainties involved in sea-level rise projections; however, the consensus is that substantial long-term sea-level rise will continue for centuries to come. Note that subsequent studies

indicate that the sea-level rise models employed in the 2007 IPCC 4th Assessment Report almost certainly underestimate future sea-level rise, because they do not include the dynamic effects of melting land-ice (which are currently not well understood). A 2011 study comparing IPCC models with satellite-based observations shows that the rate of sea-level rise between 1993 and 2011 has been 60% faster than the best IPCC estimate (3.2 ± 0.5 mm yr⁻¹ compared to 2.0 mm yr⁻¹). Rahmstorf S., G. Foster & A. Cazenave (2011) [Comparing climate projection to observations up to 2011](#), ENVIRON RES LETT 7(4). In 2009, Vermeer & Rahmstorf, using a semi-empirical method, predicted sea-levels could rise by up to 190 cm (75 – 190 cm) by 2100. Vermeer, M. & S. Rahmstorf (2009) [Global sea level linked to global temperature](#), PROC. NATL. ACAD. OF SCI. 106(51):21527-21532. In 2010 the National Research Council estimated that sea levels could rise by up to 200 cm (56 - 200 cm); and a 2012 National Research Council study estimated that global sea levels could rise by up to 167 cm (42 – 167 cm) over 2000 levels by 2100 (~60 - 185 cm over pre-industrial sea levels). National Research Council (2010) [Advancing the Science of Climate Change; and](#) National Research Council (2012) [Sea-Level Rise for the Coasts of California, Oregon, and Washington: Past, Present, and Future](#); In 2011, based on observed melting of Arctic glaciers, ice caps, and the Greenland ice-sheet, the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme of the Arctic Council estimated that sea-level rise could reach as much as 160 cm (90 - 160 cm) by the end of the century. Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (2011) [Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic: Executive Summary](#); In 2013, Hu A. *et al.* has estimated that sea levels could rise by up to 164.1 cm (130.1 ± 34 cm) over pre-industrial levels. Hu A. *et al.* (2013) [Mitigation of short-lived climate pollutants slows sea-level rise](#), NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE, advanced online publication.

¹¹⁶ Hu A. *et al.* (2013) [*Mitigation of short-lived climate pollutants slows sea-level rise*](#), NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE, advanced online publication (“Owing to changes in ocean circulation in response to global warming and changes of the ice-sheet mass and associated gravity effect, certain regions would expect SLR significantly above the global average.”); *see also* Perrette, M. *et al.* (2013) [*A scaling approach to project regional sea level rise and its uncertainties*](#), EARTH SYST. DYNAM. 4:11-29 (“However, several consistent and robust patterns emerge from our analysis: at low latitudes, especially in the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific, sea level will likely rise more than the global mean (mostly by 10–20 %). Around the northeastern Atlantic and the northeastern Pacific coasts, sea level will rise less than the global average or, in some rare cases, even fall.”); *and* National Research Council (2012) [*Sea-Level Rise for the Coasts of California, Oregon, and Washington: Past, Present, and Future*](#).

¹¹⁷ Hu A. *et al.* (2013) [*Mitigation of short-lived climate pollutants slows sea-level rise*](#), NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE, advanced online publication. (“In comparison with the BAU case, mitigation of SLCPs can reduce the SLR_{full} rate [in 2050] by about 18% (from 1.1 cm yr^{-1} to about 0.9 cm yr^{-1}).... The SLCP mitigation would contribute about 24% of the SLR_{full} rate reduction ... at 2100.”).

¹¹⁸ *Id.* (“With mitigation of both SLCPs and CO_2 , the projected SLR rate is reduced by close to 50% for SLR_{full} .”).

¹¹⁹ *Id.* Contributions from the each individual SLCP and CO_2 to reduced cumulative sea-level rise in 2100 are derived by the authors from Figure 2(c).

¹²⁰ Note that the study estimated risk of exposure based upon a 50 cm sea-level rise in 2070. This is within the range of predicted sea-level rise for the 21st century but 33% lower than the mean sea-level rise in 2070 predicted by Hu A. *et al.* (2013). Hu, A. *et al.* (2013) [*Mitigation of short-lived climate pollutants slows sea-level rise*](#), NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE, advanced online publication.

¹²¹ OECD (2010) [CITIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE](#); citing Nicholls, R. J. *et al.* (2008) [Ranking of the World's Cities Most Exposed to Coastal Flooding Today and in the Future: Exposure Estimates](#), *OECD Environment Working Paper Series*, No 1, OECD, Paris.

¹²² Hu, A. *et al.* (2013) *Mitigation of short-lived climate pollutants slows sea-level rise*, [NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE](#), advanced online publication. ("A delayed SLCP mitigation by about 25 years could reduce the impact of the CO₂ and SLCP mitigation on SLR by about 30%.").

¹²³ *Id.*, Figure 2(c).

¹²⁴ See Shindell D. *et al.* (2012) *Simultaneously mitigating near-term climate change and improving human health and food security*, *Sci.* 335(6065): 183-189; and UNEP/WMO (2011) [INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF BLACK CARBON AND TROPOSPHERIC OZONE: SUMMARY FOR DECISIONS MAKERS](#) (The UNEP/WMO and Shindell *et al.* studies analyzed the 1650 individual control measures in the technology and emission databases of the IIASA Greenhouse gas: Air pollution Interactions and Synergies (GAINS) climate model. These were grouped into 400 categories, which were then analyzed for their impacts on emissions of methane, carbon monoxide, black carbon, organic carbon, sulfur dioxide (SO₂), nitrogen oxides (NO_x), volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and carbon dioxide. The measures were further analyzed to determine the net effect of the changes in global radiative forcing (RF) due to changes in emissions of the studied gases and aerosols, and ranked according to their efficacy at reducing global RF. 130 measures were shown to reduce global RF and the top 16 of those measures were shown to produce almost 90% of the total mitigation potential. Shindell *et al.* combined four measures into two larger categories of measures, reducing to 14 the original 16 measures).

¹²⁵ UNEP (2011) [Near-term Climate Protection and Clean Air Benefits: Actions for Controlling Short-Lived Climate Forcers](#)

(“These measures can accomplish about 38 per cent reduction of global methane emissions and around 77 per cent of black carbon emissions, if implemented between now and 2030, relative to a 2030 ‘reference’ emission scenario.”); *see also* Shindell D. *et al.* (2012) *Simultaneously mitigating near-term climate change and improving human health and food security*, SCI. 335(6065):183-189.

¹²⁶ Bond T. C. *et al.* (2013) *Bounding the role of black carbon in the climate system: a scientific assessment*, Accepted for publication in the J. OF GEOPHYS. RES. –ATMOS., DOI:10.1002/jgrd.50171 (“For a few of these sources, such as diesel engines and possibly residential biofuels, warming is strong enough that eliminating all emissions from these sources would reduce net climate forcing (*i.e.*, produce cooling).”).

¹²⁷ Jacobson A., *et al.* (2013) [Black Carbon and Kerosene Lighting: An Opportunity for Rapid Action on Climate Change and Clean Energy for Development](#); and Lam N. *et al.* (2012) *Household light makes global heat: high black carbon emissions from kerosene wick lamps*, ENVIRON. SCI. TECHNOL. 46(24): 13531-8 (“Kerosene-fueled wick lamps used in millions of developing-country households are a significant but overlooked source of black carbon (BC) emissions. We present new laboratory and field measurements showing that 7-9% of kerosene consumed by widely used simple wick lamps is converted to carbonaceous particulate matter that is nearly pure BC...Kerosene lamps have affordable alternatives that pose few clear adoption barriers and would provide immediate benefit to user welfare. The net effect on climate is definitively positive forcing as co-emitted organic carbon is low. No other major BC source has such readily available alternatives, definitive climate forcing effects, and co-benefits. Replacement of kerosene-fueled wick lamps deserves strong consideration for programs that target short-lived climate forcers.”).

¹²⁸ Litehauz *et al.* (2012) [Investigation of appropriate control measures \(abatement technologies\) to reduce Black Carbon emissions from international shipping](#) (“Simply reducing vessel speed will not achieve any BC emissions reductions, and may in fact increase emissions unless the engine has electronically controlled injection and can adjust to the load. Here, the assessment is done [in] the case where slow steaming is achieved with de-rating and the technology is actually generating savings of approximately USD 2.6 per reduced g of BC.... The use of natural gas as fuel for propulsion of ships is considered attractive in terms of its potential for reduction of SO_x and NO_x, but it has considerable potential for BC reduction also. However, the barriers are high for introduction, since the ships must undergo extensive retrofitting and may lose commercial space onboard, in addition to a widespread lack of bunkering facilities. The advantage, besides the reduction of emissions, is a fuel bonus rendering LNG a most cost-effective remedy generating savings of approximately USD 1.7 per gram BC reduced.”).

¹²⁹ Molina, M., Zaelke, D., Sarma, K. M., Andersen, S. O., Ramanathan, V., & Kaniaru, D. (2009) [Reducing abrupt climate change risk using the Montreal Protocol and other regulatory actions to complement cuts in CO₂ emissions](#), PROC. NATL. ACAD. SCI. USA 106(49):20616-20621 (“BC can be reduced by approximately 50% with full application of existing technologies by 2030.... Strategies to reduce BC could borrow existing management and institutions at the international and regional levels, including existing treaty systems regulating shipping and regional air quality.”); *see also* UNEP (2011) [Near-term Climate Protection and Clean Air Benefits: Actions for Controlling Short-Lived Climate Forcers](#) (“National efforts to reduce SLCFs can build upon existing institutions, policy and regulatory frameworks related to air quality management, and, where applicable, climate change. *** Regional air pollution agreements, organizations

and initiatives may be effective mechanisms to build awareness, promote the implementation of SLCF mitigation measures, share good practices and enhance capacity. *** Global actions can help enable and encourage national and regional initiatives and support the widespread implementation of SLCF measures. A coordinated approach to combating SLCFs can build on existing institutional arrangements, ensure adequate financial support, enhance capacity and provide technical assistance at the national level.”); and Shindell D. *et al.* (2012) *Simultaneously mitigating near-term climate change and improving human health and food security*, Sci. 335:183, 188 (“Many other policy alternatives exist to implement the CH₄ [methane] and BC measures, including enhancement of current air quality regulations.”).

¹³⁰ UNEP (2011) *Near-term Climate Protection and Clean Air Benefits: Actions for Controlling Short-Lived Climate Forcers* (“About 50 per cent of both methane and black carbon emissions reductions can be achieved through measures that result in net cost savings (as a global average) over their technical lifetime. The savings occur when initial investments are offset by subsequent cost savings from, for example, reduced fuel use or utilization of recovered methane. A further third of the total methane emissions reduction could be addressed at relatively moderate costs.”).

¹³¹ Shindell D. *et al.* (2012) *Simultaneously mitigating near-term climate change and improving human health and food security*, Sci. 335(6065):183-189 (“using \$430 for climate and discounted health and agricultural values, gives a total benefit of ~\$1100 per metric ton of CH₄ (~\$700 to \$5000 per metric ton, using the above analyses). IEA estimates (37) indicate roughly 100 Tg/year of CH₄ emissions can be abated at marginal costs below \$1100, with more than 50 Tg/year costing less than 1/10 this valuation (including the value of CH₄ captured for resale). Analysis using more recent cost information in the GAINS model (38, 39) finds that the measures analyzed here could reduce 2030 CH₄ emissions

by ~110 Tg at marginal costs below \$1500 per metric ton, with 90 Tg below \$250. The full set of measures reduce emissions by ~140 Tg, indicating that most would produce benefits greater than—and for approximately two-thirds of reductions far greater than—the abatement costs. Of course, the benefits would not necessarily accrue to those incurring costs.”).

¹³² *Id.* (“GAINS estimates show that improved efficiencies lead to a net cost savings for the brick kiln and clean-burning stove BC measures. These account for ~50% of the BC measures’ impact.”).

¹³³ *Id.* (“The regulatory measures on high-emitting vehicles and banning of agricultural waste burning, which require primarily political rather than economic investment, account for another 25%. Hence, the bulk of the BC measures could probably be implemented with costs substantially less than the benefits given the large valuation of the health impacts.”).

¹³⁴ *Id.*

¹³⁵ Shindell D. *et al.* (2012) *Simultaneously mitigating near-term climate change and improving human health and food security*, SCI. 335(6065):183-189 (“Global impacts of measures on climate, agriculture, and health and their economic valuation. Valuations are annual values in 2030 and beyond, due to sustained application of the measures, which are nearly equal to the integrated future valuation of a single year’s emissions reductions (without discounting). Climate valuations for CH₄ use GWP100 and an SCC [social cost of carbon] of \$265 per metric ton.”).

¹³⁹ Zaelke D., *et al.* (2012) *Strengthening Ambition for Climate Mitigation: The Role of the Montreal Protocol in Reducing Short-Lived Climate Pollutants*, REV. EUR. COMP. & INT’L ENVTL. LAW 21(3):231-242 (“The Montreal Protocol is ideally equipped to ensure a cost-effective, efficient and orderly phase-down of HFCs because HFCs are in the same family of gases, have similar chemical properties and are used in the same sectors as CFCs and HCFCs. The Montreal Protocol is already responsible for the global phase-

out of 97% of the consumption and production of nearly 100 ozone-depleting substances and has put the stratospheric ozone layer on a path to recovery by mid-century”); and Environmental Investigation Agency (2012) [CLOSING THE EMISSIONS GAP: TIME TO PHASE OUT HFCs](#) (“The Montreal Protocol is uniquely positioned to adopt and implement a phase-out of HFCs. It has the technical, scientific and financial institutions in place, with a proven track record of phasing-out HFC precursors from the exact same industrial sectors that currently use HFCs. Moreover, the fluorocarbon industry has indicated its support for an HFC phase-down.”).

¹⁴⁰ Velders G. J. M. *et al.* (2007) *The importance of the Montreal Protocol in protecting climate*, PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. USA 104:4814.

¹⁴¹ UNEP (2012) [THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL AND THE GREEN ECONOMY: ASSESSING THE CONTRIBUTIONS AND CO-BENEFITS OF A MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENT](#).

¹⁴² [Proposed Amendment to the Montreal Protocol](#) (submitted by the Federated States of Micronesia) (16 April 2013); [Proposed Amendment to the Montreal Protocol](#) (submitted by the United States, Canada, and Mexico) (16 April 2013).

¹⁴³ England M. H. *et al.* (2009) *Constraining future greenhouse gas emissions by a cumulative target*, PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. USA 106:16539; Meinshausen M. *et al.* (2009) *Greenhouse-gas emission targets for limiting global warming to 2°C*, NAT. 458:1158; and Velders G. J. M. *et al.* (2009) *The large contribution of projected HFC emissions to future climate forcing*, PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. USA 106:10949. (The cumulative BAU emission from the 6 Kyoto gases from 2000-50 is about 975 GtC-eq (=650 x 1.5, Fig. 1, Scenario 6 (England *et al.*)), which is equivalent to approximately 3575 Gt CO₂-eq. The cumulative Kyoto-gas emission budget for 2000-50 is 1500 GtCO₂-eq. if the probability of exceeding 2°C is to be limited to approximately 25% (Meinshausen *et al.*, pg. 1160). Therefore, the total mitigation

needed by 2050 is approximately 2075 GtCO₂-eq. The 87-147 GtCO₂-eq. from the proposed HFC phase down represents 4-7% of the total mitigation needed by 2050, and up to 8% if all HFCs are replaced by low-GWP substitutes.).

¹⁴⁴ UNEP (2012) [THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL AND THE GREEN ECONOMY: ASSESSING THE CONTRIBUTIONS AND CO-BENEFITS OF A MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENT](#); *citing* the following sources listed as they are cited in the figure (1) Velders G. J. M. *et al.* (2007) *The importance of the Montreal Protocol in protecting climate*, PROC. NAT'L. ACAD. SCI. USA 104:4814; (2) Velders G. J. M. *et al.* (2007) [THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL, CELEBRATING 20 YEARS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS](#), ed. Kaniaru D (Cameron May, London, UK); (3) Montreal Protocol Technology and Economic Assessment Panel (2009) [Task Force Decision XX/7 Interim Report: Environmentally Sound Management of Banks of Ozone-Depleting Substances](#); (4) UNEP Riso (2009) [A Primer on CDM Programme of Activities](#); (5) Velders G. J. M. *et al.* (2007) *The importance of the Montreal Protocol in protecting climate*, PROC. NAT'L. ACAD. SCI. USA 104:4814; (6) Velders G. J. M. *et al.* (2009) *The large contribution of projected HFC emissions to future climate forcing*, PROC. NAT'L. ACAD. SCI. USA 106:10949. Note: Estimates are for direct emissions, and do not include CO₂ reductions from energy efficiency improvements.

¹⁴⁵ Montreal Protocol Technology and Economic Assessment Panel (2009) [Task Force Decision XX/8 Report: Assessment of Alternatives to HCFCs and HFCs and Update of the TEAP 2005 Supplement Report Data](#).

¹⁴⁶ Velders G. J. M. *et al.* (2009) *The large contribution of projected HFC emissions to future climate forcing*, PROC. NAT'L. ACAD. SCI. USA 106:10949 ("Global HFC emissions significantly exceed previous estimates after 2025 with developing country emissions as much as 800% greater than in developed countries in 2050. Global HFC emissions in 2050 are equivalent to 9–19%

(CO₂-eq. basis) of projected global CO₂ emissions in business-as-usual scenarios and contribute a radiative forcing equivalent to that from 6–13 years of CO₂ emissions near 2050. This percentage increases to 28–45% compared with projected CO₂ emissions in a 450-ppm CO₂ stabilization scenario business-as-usual scenarios from 2010 to 2050”).

¹⁴⁷ Schwarz W. *et al.* (2011) [Preparatory Study for a Review of Regulation \(EC\) No 842/2006 on Certain Fluorinated Greenhouse Gases: Final Report](#).

¹⁴⁸ U.S. Env'tl. Prot. Agency (2011) [EPA AND NHTSA FINALIZE HISTORIC NATIONAL PROGRAM TO REDUCE GREENHOUSE GASES AND IMPROVE FUEL ECONOMY FOR CARS AND TRUCKS](#).

¹⁴⁹ U.S. Fed. Reg. (2012) [2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards](#) 77:199 (“In addition to the grams-per-mile CO₂-equivalent credits, for the first time the agencies are establishing provisions in the CAFE program that would account for improvements in air conditioner efficiency. Improving A/C efficiency leads to real-world fuel economy benefits, because as explained above, A/C operation represents an additional load on the engine. Thus, more efficient A/C operation imposes less of a load and allows the vehicle to go farther on a gallon of gas.”).

¹⁵⁰ California Air Resources Board, [Low-Emission Vehicles \(LEV\) & GHG 2012](#); and California Air Resources Board (2012) [Final Regulation Order: “LEV III” Amendments to the California Greenhouse Gas and Criteria Pollutant Exhaust and Evaporative Emission Standards and Test Procedures and to the On-Board Diagnostic System Requirements for Passenger Cars, Light-Duty Trucks, and Medium-Duty Vehicles, and to the Evaporative Emission Requirements for Heavy-Duty Vehicles](#).

¹⁵¹ U.S. Fed. Reg. (2011) [Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy Duty Engines and Vehicles](#), 76:179.

¹⁵² European Commission (2012) [REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL ON FLUORINATED GREENHOUSE GASES](#), COM(2012)0643 final; *and* European Parliament, Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (2013) [DRAFT REPORT ON THE PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL ON FLUORINATED GREENHOUSE GASES](#), 2012/0305(COD). (In November 2012 the European Commission published a proposal to strengthen their fluorinated greenhouse gas (f-gas) regulations, calling for an economy-wide phase-down of f-gases, managed by a quota system for importers and producers, along with use bans and better equipment seals. In March 2013 the European Parliament's rapporteur, Bas Eickhout, submitted a report containing a number of amendments to the 2012 proposal, including: earlier and additional bans on new refrigeration and air conditioning equipment containing HFCs, bans on "pre-charged" equipment, mandatory destruction of by-product HFC-23 emissions from the manufacture of f-gases including production of feedstocks, and a faster phase-down schedule. The amendments also call for implementation of a fee system for import and production quotas as well as reporting requirements for the import, export, or production of more than 500 tonnes CO₂-eq of f-gases in a calendar year. The European Parliament will debate the report and it will be voted upon on 19 June 2013, if the proposal does not pass it will be brought for a second vote, likely in 2014, after which it will go through a conciliation process.) Several provisions would impose trade restrictions. *See, e.g.*, Article 12 (pre-charge ban), Article 6 (by-product destruction requirement), Annex III (bans on new HFC-based equipment), and Article 14 (phase downs, which are strengthened over time).

¹⁵³ Consumer Goods Forum (2012) [Better Lives Through Better Business](#), 10; *see also* The Consumer Goods Forum, [Sustainability Pillar](#).

¹⁵⁴ Velders G. J. M. *et al.* (2009) *The large contribution of projected HFC emissions to future climate forcing*, PROC. NAT'L. ACAD. SCI. USA 106:10949.

¹⁵⁵ United Nations (2012) *Resolution adopted by the General Assembly: The Future We Want*, A/RES/66/288.

¹⁵⁶ UNEP (2011) *Report of the Combined Ninth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the Twenty-Third Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer*, par 156. The Bangkok Declaration can be found at UNEP (2010) [Twenty-second Meeting of the Parties, Annex III: Declaration on the Global Transition away from Hydrofluorocarbons \(HFCs\) and Chlorofluorocarbons \(CFCs\)](#).

¹⁵⁷ UNEP (2012) [Report of the Twenty-Fourth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer](#), par. 189. The Bali Declaration can be found at UNEP (2011) [Report of the combined ninth meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the Twenty-Third Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer](#), Annex IX.

¹⁵⁸ Prepared for IGSD by Dr. Guus Velders, based on Velders G. J. M. *et al.* (2009) *The large contribution of projected HFC emissions to future climate forcing*, PROC. NAT'L. ACAD. SCI. USA 106:10949; *see also* Velders G. J. M. *et al.* (2007) *The importance of the Montreal Protocol in protecting climate*, PROC. NAT'L. ACAD. SCI. USA 104:4814; *Proposed Amendment to the Montreal Protocol* (submitted by the Federated States of Micronesia) (28 Apr. 2011 at 4-6 and 9); *and* UNEP (2011) *HFCs: A Critical Link in Protecting Climate and the Ozone Layer*, 10.

¹⁵⁹ Climate and Clean Air Coalition to Reduce Short Lived Climate Pollutants, *About*; *see also* US Dept. of State, [The Climate and Clean Air Coalition to Reduce Short-Lived Climate Pollutants: Fact Sheet](#) (16 Feb. 2012).

¹⁶⁰ Climate and Clean Air Coalition to Reduce Short-Lived Climate Pollutants, [Actions](#).

¹⁶¹ C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, Video: *C40 Mayors Demonstrate Progress in Greenhouse Gas Reductions and Announce New Actions to Take on Climate Change*, (27 June 2012); Press Release, UNEP, [Cities Join Forces with the Climate and Clean Air coalition to Tackle Solid Waste](#), (12 March 2013).

¹⁶² Harvey F., [Rare note of harmony at Doha as action agreed on black carbon: The 25 members of the Climate and Clean Air Coalition have agreed to reduce black carbon, methane and ozone](#), *The Guardian* (6 December 2012).

¹⁶³ Press Release, G8, [Camp David Declaration](#) (19 May 2012) (“Recognizing the impact of short-lived climate pollutants on near-term climate change, agricultural productivity, and human health, we support, as a means of promoting increased ambition and complementary to other CO₂ and GHG emission reduction efforts, comprehensive actions to reduce these pollutants, which, according to UNEP and others, account for over thirty percent of near-term global warming as well as 2 million premature deaths a year. Therefore, we agree to join the Climate and Clean Air Coalition to Reduce Short-lived Climate Pollutants.”).

¹⁶⁴ Press Release, UNEP, [Climate and Clean Air Coalition Working with Oil and Gas Companies to Reduce Methane and Black Carbon Emissions](#) (28 January, 2013).

¹⁶⁵ Press Release, UNEP, [Cities Join Forces with the Climate and Clean Air Coalition to Tackle Solid Waste](#) (12 March 2013) (“Participating cities include Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; Cali, Colombia; Viña del Mar, Chile; New York City, USA; Stockholm, Sweden; Accra, Ghana; Lagos, Nigeria; Penang, Malaysia; Dhaka, Bangladesh; Ho Chi Minh, Vietnam; and Tokyo, Japan.”)

¹⁶⁶ Press Release, US Dept. of State, [G8 Foreign Ministers' Meeting Statement](#) (11 April 2013) (“Ministers recognised the ambitious measures already undertaken to reduce greenhouse

gases, noting that action needs to continue and intensify as a matter of urgency. Ministers remain committed to long term efforts with a view to limiting effectively the increase in global average temperature below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, consistent with science. The G8 remain fully committed ... increase mitigation ambition in the pre-2020 timeframe, including through international cooperative initiatives such as the Climate and Clean Air Coalition; and to the developed countries' goal of mobilising jointly USD 100bn per year by 2020, from a wide variety of public and private sources, in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation.”).

¹⁶⁷ Press Release, UNEP, *New Climate and Clean Air Coalition Expands to 13 Members* (24 April 2012).

¹⁶⁸ Press Release, Canada, *Canada Invests in Global Climate and Clean Air Solutions* (10 April 2013).

¹⁶⁹ Climate and Clean Air Coalition to Reduce Short-Lived Climate Pollutants, *Non-State Partners: World Bank*. (“The draft review of the World Bank portfolio undertaken for the G8 report has found that between FY2007-12, US\$ 30 billion supported SLCP-reducing activities appear in 292 investment projects. The annual commitment to SLCP reducing activities based on the average of the last three years (FY10-12) is approximately 12.5 percent of overall lending volume. The World Bank has committed to increase commitments to SLCP reducing activities to 15 percent by 2015 and 20 percent by 2020 respectively.”)

¹⁷⁰ Kyte R., *Doha: Keeping Hope Alive – Just, World Bank Blogs* (12 December 2012) (“At the Bank, we want to expand the SLCP-relevant part of our IDA/IBRD portfolio from 12 percent in 2012 to 15 percent by 2015 and 20 percent by 2020, and will work on payment for results for methane reduction. We also plan to increase impact on SLCPs through our GEF, Carbon Finance, Global Gas Flaring, and Montreal Protocol portfolios.”).

¹⁷¹ Press Release, G8, [*Camp David Declaration*](#) (19 May 2012); see also Lean G., [*G8: Leaders open up vital new front in the battle to control global warming*](#), *The Telegraph* (21 May, 2012)

¹⁷² Climate and Climate Air Coalition to Reduce Short Lived Climate Pollutants, [Partners](#).

¹⁷³ Economic Commission for Europe, (2012) [Amendment of annex I to the 1999 Protocol to Abate Acidification, Eutrophication and Ground-level Ozone](#), ECE/EB.AIR/111/Add.1.

¹⁷⁴ Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves, [The Alliance](#); Global Methane Initiative, [About the Initiative](#).

¹⁷⁵ UNEP (2008) [ATMOSPHERIC BROWN CLOUDS: REGIONAL ASSESSMENT REPORT WITH FOCUS ON ASIA](#), 3 (“1. Five regional ABC hotspots around the world have been identified: i) East Asia; ii) Indo-Gangetic Plain in South Asia; iii) Southeast Asia; iv) Southern Africa; and v) the Amazon Basin. By integrating and assimilating ABC surface observations with new satellite observations and chemistry transport model (CTM), the ABC Science Team produced global maps of ABC hotspots.

¹⁷⁶ International Maritime Organization, Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) [IMO Environment Meeting Completes Packed Agenda](#) (19 July 2011).

¹⁷⁷ Litehauz *et al.* (2012) [Investigation of appropriate control measures \(abatement technologies\) to reduce Black Carbon emissions from international shipping](#).

¹⁷⁸ Ministry of the Environment Sweden (2013) [Chairs Conclusions from the Arctic Environment Ministers Meeting: Arctic Change – Global Effects](#), 2.

¹⁷⁹ European Commission (2012) [REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL ON FLUORINATED GREENHOUSE GASES](#), COM(2012)0643 final; and European Parliament, Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (2013) [DRAFT REPORT ON THE PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL ON FLUORINATED GREENHOUSE GASES](#), 2012/0305(COD).

¹⁸⁰ Markowitz, K. & Grossman D. (2009) *Cost Effective Management of National Climate Policy: Application of Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Indicators*, in International Network for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement (2009) [INECE Special Report on Climate Compliance](#) (“Reducing Soot Emissions at Ports: One of the primary short-term climate forcing agents is black carbon, which warms the planet by absorbing heat, raising ambient temperatures, and reducing the albedo of the surfaces it falls upon. Many countries currently have, or are developing, laws to control and limit emissions at ports (e.g., emissions from ships, trucks, trains, and other diesel-powered equipment). A number of ports in the United States and Europe could utilize ECE indicators to ensure compliance with the programs they have installed to control speed, to promote retrofitting, and to test emissions”)

¹⁸¹ The Connect U.S. Fund, [A Call to the President to Sustain and Enhance U.S. Global Leadership](#) (8 December 2012) (calling on the President to “Continue action to reduce short-lived climate pollutants (e.g., black carbon, methane, and HFCs), by strengthening bilateral cooperation with major emerging economies at the head of state level; adequately funding and setting goals for the Climate and Clean Air Coalition; pushing for a phase out of HFCs under the Montreal Protocol; and establishing an inter-agency task force to reduce short-lived climate pollutants.”); and Bachmann J., and Seidel S. (2013) [DOMESTIC POLICIES TO REDUCE THE NEAR-TERM RISKS OF CLIMATE CHANGE](#) (“As a first step under this initiative, the Administration could issue a new Executive Order, direct agencies to begin advancing the regulatory and program actions identified below, and establish an interagency Short-Lived Climate Pollutant Task Force to coordinate and monitor implementation of this effort and to identify additional actions going forward.”). Existing authorities that such a Task Force could use to reduce SLCPs are

described in Institute for Governance & Sustainable Development (2013) [PROPOSED US TASK FORCE TO ADDRESS SHORT-LIVED CLIMATE POLLUTANTS: OVERVIEW OF ABATEMENT OPTIONS](#); *see also* World Resources Institute (2013) [CAN THE U.S. GET THERE FROM HERE? USING EXISTING FEDERAL LAWS AND STATE ACTION TO REDUCE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS](#).

¹⁸² United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2013) [HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013: THE RISE OF THE SOUTH: HUMAN PROGRESS IN A DIVERSE WORLD](#).

¹⁸³ Hu A. *et al.* (2013) [Mitigation of short-lived climate pollutants slows sea-level rise](#), NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE, advanced online publication. ("By the end of the twenty-first century, the effect of CO₂ mitigation on temperature increases by tenfold to ~1.1°C compared with the mitigation of 0.1°C by 2050. This, in conjunction with the SLCP mitigation, is sufficient to avoid reaching the 2°C threshold until 2100.").

¹⁸⁴ *See* Molina, M., Zaelke, D., Sarma, K. M., Andersen, S. O., Ramanathan, V., & Kaniaru, D. (2009) [Reducing abrupt climate change risk using the Montreal Protocol and other regulatory actions to complement cuts in CO₂ emissions](#), PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. USA 106(49):20616-20621.